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This thesis evaluated the eminent domain laws of the top-ranking nations in property rights 
based on the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey: Singapore, New Zealand, and 
Switzerland. The United States is not top-ranking in property rights and serves as the base 
comparator given its history and jurisprudence on property. The thesis results prove the 
imprecision in measuring property rights without evaluating the substantive legal protections and 
the perceptions of the Survey participants. Switzerland appears to have the strongest quality and 
quantity of property safeguards. Switzerland is a federation with a long-standing history of 
subnational governments protecting landowner rights, similar to the United States. Switzerland 
may serve as the model eminent domain jurisdiction for civil code countries with parliamentary 
supremacy, and the U.S. may serve as the model jurisdiction for common law countries with 
constitutional supremacy. Although lacking in unamendable substantive protections, New Zealand 
and Singapore demonstrate that general property rights are not a prerequisite to legislating a stable, 
equitable eminent domain process that would mitigate the displacement of landowners. They 
introduce the baseline protections for common law or civil law countries, given how many judges 
enforce the eminent domain legislation without a challenge. The numerical value given to the top-
ranking countries in the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey insufficiently 
reflects the substantive legal protections between other higher-performing countries. The specific 
numerical value awarded to each country should be given less persuasive authority in making 
nuanced comparisons on property rights between countries when the Survey is the primary data 
source of the comparison.
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CHAPTER 1 – THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This thesis evaluates the legal substance of the World Economic Forum’s Executive 
Opinion Survey (“WEF Survey”) results on property rights that the Heritage Foundation, Fraser 
Institute, and academic scholars implement in their research.1 There is a small controversy about 
whether the economic freedom indices or the WEF Survey account for the improvement of 
property rights over time.2 The research institutions have modified the data points and weights 
given to each criterion over the years.3 This thesis will determine first whether higher ranks 
measuring property rights from the WEF Survey and economic freedom indices correspond to 
greater legal protections. Do higher rankings accurately reflect a legal regime that is more 
protective of private property rights? Second, based on this analysis of higher-ranked nations, how 
can the United States improve on the constitutional protection of property rights and compensation 
procedures for eminent domain proceedings? This thesis will analyze Singapore, Switzerland, and 
New Zealand (collectively known as the “Studied Nations”) because they are the usual leaders 
when ranking countries for their property rights in the WEF Survey and the economic freedom 
indices.  
 
The Empirical Questions. Specifically, the research will ask two questions: 
(1) What substantive and procedural laws, arguments, and safeguards generate private 
property protections in the Studied Nations?4  
(2) Do the Studied Nations have more or better laws protecting property rights compared to 
the United States? If yes, how could the United States combine the best landowner 
protections against eminent domain from the Studied Nations to create a preferred U.S. 
property rights regime? 





Hypothesis. A country with a higher rank in reports measuring property rights probably 
has laws that protect property better compared to lower-ranking countries. Switzerland, Singapore, 
and New Zealand are ranked higher than the United States when measuring property rights. The 
alternative hypothesis is Switzerland, Singapore, and New Zealand have more and/or better laws 
protecting property rights compared to the United States. Even if this alternative hypothesis is 
proven false, the United States can learn how its eminent domain laws compare to the Studied 
Nations legislating their eminent domain power. 
Research Methodology. This thesis shall evaluate the eminent domain laws in the three 
Studied Nations. Each country has legal research tools to facilitate the investigation of each 
country’s laws. U.S. data was extracted from Westlaw, JSTOR, EBSCOhost, and ProQuest. 
Singapore data was extracted from JustisOne, Singapore Statutes Online, and the Land Acquisition 
Appeals Board. New Zealand data was extracted from Lexis Quicklaw, New Zealand Legal 
Information Institute, and specific New Zealand court websites. Switzerland data was extracted 
from Swisslex, the Federal Supreme Court’s website with its case law search engine,5 and some 
legislation on the Federal Council’s website.6 The data includes case law, statutes, ordinances, 
codes, and commentary. Many secondary sources assisted the data collection and interpretation of 
the Studied Nations’ laws and cultures: e.g., treatises, books, journal papers, and government 
websites.  
This thesis covers a constructive portion of the eminent domain laws; however, it does not 
intend, nor is there enough pages,7 to be a comprehensive treatise on the topics within the Studied 
Nations. Instead, the researcher intends to identify some of the important legal rules, procedures, 




and defenses from the landowner-condemnee’s perspective with the objective of preserving private 
property interests with respect to each Studied Nations’ eminent domain power and police powers. 
This thesis is also not concerned with the cantonal level protections found in Swiss cantonal 
constitutions, expropriation legislation, and case law. Swiss case law is relied upon with limited 
authoritativeness since Switzerland has a civil law system. No domestic courts can contest 
legislation of the Federal Assembly or Federal Council, meaning the courts lack a judicial review 
power to overturn laws as unconstitutional.8 However, the legislature can assign certain matters 
for judicial review, and the courts can ensure conformity with the laws and the constitution 
generally.9 The legislature ratifies constitutional objects, while the courts manage the 
administration and compliance of those objects.10 Nonetheless, the courts did contribute to the 
creation of Swiss property rights. The Federal Supreme Court established the federal property 
rights framework by a tenacious application of the cantons’ constitutional property protections.11 
Furthermore, federal and cantonal authorities can refuse to apply federal legislation if they find the 
specific application contravenes the constitution.12 
Comparative legal research helps attorneys see how other legal systems answer and 
rationalize legal problems, which sharpens the depth and application of laws within other 
jurisdiction.13 There are many barriers to fulfilling comparative legal research. The source-
country’s law libraries are the best sources of that foreign law, not the local law library.14 
Computer-assisted legal research,15 interlibrary loans, and other technological services have 
substantially improved worldwide access, readability, and recordation of foreign law.16 Other 
difficulties of comparative research include the political and historical backgrounds of each 
country-comparator and the knowledge of each society’s prevailing attitude towards the law.17 
These insights extend beyond the needs of the domestic practitioner looking for foreign authority 




on a matter;18 nonetheless, the lack of funding or resources to explain the culture omits other 
interesting comparative findings.19 A specific comparative property law issue is indigenous history 
and property rights. Indigenous land rights may vary greatly based on the federal government’s 
treatment of aboriginal title.20 Some countries may acknowledge competing land claims between 
aboriginal title and the general title registration systems:21 either the Torrens system or the 
recording system.22  
For the United States, the subnational governments are the forefront users of eminent 
domain.23 Thus, this thesis shall evaluate and review one state’s eminent domain laws alongside 
the federal eminent domain minimum standard. Alabama has been selected as the base-comparator 
subnational jurisdiction because Alabama has been ranked first in land-use freedom under the Cato 
Institute’s Freedom in the 50 States, even when the land-use freedom ranking is selected to 
measure only eminent domain criteria.24 Alabama is the only state to have fully adopted the 
Uniform Law Commission’s Eminent Domain Code.25 The subnational evaluation will mention 
other states that are outliers in landowner defenses.  
Outline of This Thesis. The paper is subdivided into six chapters. Chapter 2 is the 
literature review, briefing the current research findings and rankings on comparative property 
rights from the WEF Survey, Heritage Foundation, and other research. The background of the 
United States and Alabama takings law establishes the legal foundation we hope to improve. 
Within the background, we will discuss the constitutional, compensatory, and due process property 
protections.  
 Subsequently, the Studied Nations will be compared on three broad categories: 
constitutional protections, compensation structure, and protections found in the nation’s statutes, 
common law, or legal culture. Each Studied Nation will have a chapter devoted to it: Singapore is 




Chapter 3, New Zealand is Chapter 4, and Switzerland is Chapter 5. All Studied Nations have a 
constitution and primary legislation controlling expropriation procedures, and these chapters will 
reveal whether the eminent domain powers are unrestrained or procedurally burdenless. The 
chapters will survey the legal opportunities landowners have to restore their economic position 
after forfeiting realty towards the government’s objective. The noteworthy similarities or 
distinctions between a Studied Nation and the United States, if any, will be mentioned in the final 
chapter or briefly in each Studied Nation’s respective chapter to mitigate redundancy. 
 Chapter 6, entitled Discussion, summarizes the author’s findings and personal observation 
during the research. Specifically, the Discussion answers (1) how the United States could provide 
better substantive or procedural property rights based on the laws in New Zealand, Switzerland, 
and Singapore, and (2) what laws in the Studied Nation and the United States would consolidate 
into the best legal characteristics of each nation? Consolidating the legal principles that make the 
country preferable for landowner-condemnees undergoing expropriations should improve any 
country’s rankings in property rights, including the United States.   
 
CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW & THE BASE COMPARATOR 
Background. The Fraser Institute,26 Heritage Foundation,27 Cato Institute,28 and the 
Property Rights Alliance29 reported that the United States has gradually declined in their property 
rights rankings on numerous Economic Freedom Indices, while other countries have surpassed the 
United States since the early mid-2000s. Economic Freedom is polysemous and includes concepts 
such as “personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to enter markets and compete, and security 
of the person and privately owned property.”30 Advocates of economic freedom presume 
“individuals know their needs and desires best and that a self-directed life, guided by one’s own 




philosophies and priorities rather than those of a government or technocratic elite, is the foundation 
of a fulfilling existence.”31  
Economic Freedom Indices assess numerous criteria when computing a nation’s overall 
property rights, including, but not limited to, physical property rights, intellectual property rights, 
and the legal enforcement of contracts.32 Overall, the Indices find Singapore, Switzerland, and 
New Zealand as the best facilitators of private property protections.33 For some Indices, the United 
States does not rank in the top 20 countries.34 Each economic freedom or property rights index 
derives its property rights data, all or in part, from the World Economic Forum’s annual Global 
Competitiveness Report, which analyzes the results of the annual WEF Survey.35 The WEF Survey 
asks only one question to gauge the integrity of a nation’s property rights, and participants answer 
by selecting a number between 1 through 7:36 a Likert scale.37 The WEF Survey’s property rights 
question asks:  
In your country, to what extent are property rights, including financial assets, 
protected?  [1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent]38 
For 2018, the WEF Survey consisted of 12,274 responses from business executives located in 134 
economies.39 For 2019, the same question was answered by a WEF Survey of 12,987 business 
executives in 134 economies.40 The Global Competitiveness Report has successfully maintained 
its credibility as “the longest-running and most extensive survey of its kind,”41 which explains why 
other research institutions would trust the Report’s data in their studies. 
Many variables affect the actual and perceived security that the government shall enforce 
private property protections and render a restitutionary remedy for the harmed property owner 
when the government expropriates the land. Business culture, bribery, judicial impartiality, 
discriminatory selection in taking the land, the cost and time of appealing expropriations, and the 




conferred legal protections can bolster or limit proprietors defending their property.42 This thesis 
will compare the substantive laws of top-ranking countries in property rights against the United 
States. The United States is a major economic powerhouse given its gross domestic product, 
market size, and the ease of doing business.43  However, the United States is a distant competitor 
from the top-ranking Studied Nations concerning property rights, although it has a constitutional 
property defense.44 These characteristics make the United States a meaningful base-comparator; 
the nation is a developed market that could improve its eminent domain laws without overturning 
its legal ordering. The Studied Nations were selected because of their high, undefeated ranks in 
property rights per the WEF Survey, the diminutive comparative property law research on the 
Studied Nations within the United States, and the available legal resources to conduct the research. 
Indisputably, the Studied Nations and the United States have vastly different legal institutions, 
cultures, population sizes, land areas, histories, government structures, and policy considerations. 
These distinctions do not hamper the Studied Nations from being the most competitive and 
economically free countries in the world – sometimes surpassing the United States.45 
Eminent Domain Expectations & The Compromises of Property Rights. Eminent 
domain exists to implement a public advantage that is not despotic46 or taking only what is 
necessary to operate the country.47 What society considers an advantage to the general public has 
shifted with time,48 and humanity’s continuous affirmation of the government’s eminent domain 
power derives from culture, tradition, and political necessity rather than an economic evaluation.49 
The government body or head of state, possessing the most power, controls the land given its direct 
threat of force on its proprietors, whether or not the power is carried out.50 Nonetheless, eminent 
domain serves a vital objective: to avoid a single seller from obstructing the installation of 
infrastructure for common carriers,51 assuming the seller cannot partner with the common carrier’s 




development or lease the right-of-way.52 If beneficiaries of the public good are identifiable and 
less than the whole community, then a tax assessing those individuals would be ideal.53 Utility 
lines or railroads have fewer options since thousands of individuals benefit from those services. 
One landowner may request more money to voluntarily execute a right-of-way, frustrating 
development and causing the creation of a more expensive, alternative route that raises the 
transaction costs of the utility and the consumer prices for service.54 The utility company must pay 
the one landowner – the holdout – more consideration to maintain the shortest, convenient path or 
pay more development costs to reroute the utility line to the intended destination for the public’s 
consumption. Failing to install basic utilities on residential or commercial buildings may paralyze 
economic growth due to the outdated or missing land improvements – e.g., the buildings have no 
electricity or internet access.55 High transaction costs may also induce the common carrier to 
abandon servicing lands beyond the holdout.56  
Conversely, overbroad public use standards invite degradation of property rights for 
unnecessary reasons or coercive transfers from the smaller landowners to the economically or 
politically powerful.57 If the threat of expropriation can reduce property values, the expropriator 
may holdout the land acquisition to realize the reduction in compensation.58 Besides eminent 
domain abuse, there is no empirical conclusion that eminent domain generates more economic 
efficiency compared to the free market in all cases.59 Eminent domain is a compromise between 
the government’s axiomatic duty to serve common societal needs and to respect private property 
rights, generally, while indemnifying landowners for property infringements that advance those 
common needs.60 Although the eminent domain power is customarily absolute, a free society 
restricts the scope of the government’s power to situations where it will fulfill a societal need 




efficiently, which excludes expropriations for the betterment of private interests or tyrannical 
objectives.61 
Measuring Substantive Property Rights. For purposes of this thesis, a pro-landowner 
eminent domain system is assessed on two factors: (1) the ease of exercising or delegating the 
eminent domain power, and (2) the quality of the landowner-victim’s compensation for the taking 
and ancillary injuries. Regarding the first factor, a constitution or statute may confine the 
government’s expropriation power to certain public works. The power may have a precondition 
that the government owns the property after the taking, or the citizenry can access or benefit from 
the expropriated land.62 The ease of exercising the power may have procedural requirements, 
prolonging the power’s utility or threatening the project’s legitimacy in court. Regarding the 
second factor, compensation rights indemnifies landowners, a minority economic group, against 
arbitrary government actions, and it promises the government’s good faith, fair-dealing when the 
government forces an individual to bear an overwhelming public burden.63 The quality of the 
landowner’s compensation determines a government’s honesty when intruding on private property 
or whether the compensation deters government interference with the landowner’s business or 
livelihood on the land.64 Specifically, a government promising full compensation yet relies on a 
loophole to elude paying compensation proves dishonest government fair-dealings with its people. 
Meanwhile, a government that promises an unspecified range of compensation may lawfully pay 
below fair-market value for any project. The government has little risk when expropriating land 
for a legitimate, ordinary public use, and landowners have endless reasons to fear investing in a 
property with a foreseeable expropriation risk. If a government has no limitations on exercising 
eminent domain and no specified compensation awards, a government could legally expropriate a 
newly constructed building from a private individual for an agency’s use and pay compensation 




below the building development costs. Albeit coincidental that the government expropriated the 
building near the building’s completion, the landowner would struggle proving the government’s 
mala fides from the beginning.  
Statement of the Situation & Test Case. In the United States, the doctrinal hindrance of 
property protections arose, most recently, from the U.S. Supreme Court case, Kelo v. City of New 
London.65 The Court held that the local government could expropriate property from the immediate 
private landowner for conveyance to a different private individual if the expropriation served a 
public use.66 The Court stated that the sovereign could not use its eminent domain powers to 
expropriate land from one private property owner to give to another private individual for that 
other individual’s sole benefit or “under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual 
purpose was to bestow a private benefit.”67 Although public use and public purpose have 
historically been different terms or antonyms,68 the Court adopted the modern, broader 
interpretation of making public use synonymous with public purpose.69 Some state courts find 
questioning the public purpose to be irrelevant once the government asserts its purpose.70 We will 
see that this absolute deference to the government is the prevalent international interpretation. In 
Kelo, the majority opinion failed to limit the modern public use doctrine.71 The government has 
no obligation to oversee the expropriated property’s conversion into the public use or to hold the 
private beneficiary of the expropriation accountable for achieving the claimed public use in the 
approved plan to expropriate the land.72 Under the existing legal framework, the private 
beneficiary could immediately abandon the public use without penalties.73 The private 
beneficiaries in Kelo’s confiscation and in Kelo’s predecessor74 never completed their anticipated 
redevelopment projects.75 Preexisting businesses and homes were lost with no replacement.76 
Some states allow a grace period for the victim to repurchase their expropriated property,77 but 




this presumes the compensation was not consumed in the victim’s purchase of a new domicile or 
the victim had saved sufficient funds to relocate, find new employment, and repurchase the 
property. The expropriated land may appreciate in value when the government offers the victim a 
right of first refusal to repurchase the land. Converting a residence into a commercial operation 
would amplify the land value for investors. If the victim had to pay full market value to repurchase 
the property, the victim must pay above her compensation award and restoration costs. 
The Supreme Court also found a corporation vaguely promising increased tax revenues 
and new jobs after expropriating the land could qualify as a public use.78 Practically, private-to-
private takings are constitutional if predicated on producing a secondary benefit for the public 
under a redevelopment plan producing aesthetic pleasure or economic revitalization.79 Justice 
Thomas marked the factual distinction between Kelo and its predecessors, “There [was] no 
allegation that any of these properties [were] blighted or otherwise in poor condition; rather, they 
were condemned only because they happen to be located in the development area.”80 The courts 
do not review the efficacy of the government’s development plan if it appears comprehensive81 or 
stems from a legislative economic policy.82 
The indigent property owner faces a greater risk of the government taking their property 
due to this ruling and the continued use of blight condemnation to justify the expropriation.83 Blight 
or slum clearance is legal parlance for land that is detrimental to public health-and-safety and 
creates an economic liability.84 The properties are usually dilapidated, abandoned, or unsanitary.85 
Blight statutes are associated with a municipality’s police power or eminent domain power to 
“transform an entire slum area into a wholesome section of the community[.]”86 A municipality 
prefers to classify areas as blight with ease because completing a plan to revitalize the local 
economy or improve public safety requires years of effort.87 Objective criteria hinders 




discriminatory rulings about whether realty qualifies as blight,88 yet most statutes defining blight 
include criteria beyond the landowner’s control, which inhibits private landowner action 
attempting to cure the blight of her land and the community.89 The government can also expropriate 
non-blight properties near slums if the municipality finds those properties necessary for 
redevelopment plans.90 The government is not federally obligated to redraft the redevelopment 
plan to carve out non-blight property.91 In opposition, states that follow a narrow “public use” 
definition find the condemnation of non-blight property in a redevelopment plan unconstitutional92 
because blight condemnations can be parcel-by-parcel questions.93 A narrow “public use” 
definition constrains expropriations to usage or rights to use by the public, and establishes fixed 
guideposts for reexamining legislative and judicial action, unswayed by popular feelings or judicial 
temperaments.94  
Returning to the Kelo decision, it accelerated the use of eminent domain across America to 
replace “lower tax producing businesses for higher tax producing ones[.]”95 Further, there is 
evidence of government employees’ vindictive harassment towards the recalcitrant landowners in 
Kelo,96 and no compensation amount can excuse mistreatment to family and communities, 
delegitimizing the eminent domain power.97 Constitutionally, Kelo created a loophole for private-
to-private takings of non-blight property for private development without judicial criticism.98 It 
undermines the overwhelming cultural and legal authority holding private-to-private takings as 
unconstitutional.99 
To remedy the public abhorrence of the Kelo decision,100 many states enacted eminent 
domain reform legislation, which produced illusory solutions.101 In the U.S., the subnational 
governments can legislate greater protections or more stringent governmental constraints than the 
federal constitution’s minimum requirements only if the states do not eliminate the minimum 




federal protections.102 The subnational governments can constitutionally enact independent or 
superior rights beyond the federal government because (1) federal laws does not answer every 
legal issue, the Supremacy Clause cannot preempt state law when Congress has not enacted laws 
about that issue; (2) many legal powers are delegated to the states through the Tenth Amendment, 
(3) some powers are exclusive to the states, and (4) additional rights that comply or exceed the 
available federal rights do not counterpoise those federal rights.103 With the federal government’s 
acquiescence, the states have numerous reasons to gain additional constitutional rights and create 
independent state constitutional analyses based on “(1) [the state constitution’s] textual language; 
(2) differences in the texts; (3) [the state’s] constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) 
structural differences [between the federal and state constitutions]; and (6) matters of particular 
state or local concern.”104 Therefore, the States can narrow the public use interpretation accepted 
by the U.S. Supreme Court because it is not providing less than the minimum federal requirements 
– due process and compensation when property is taken for a public use.105 
The Economic Freedom Indices’ conclusions about U.S. property rights correlate with the 
literature on U.S. eminent domain jurisprudence. According to Andre LeDuc, U.S. eminent 
domain law “appears unpredictable, unprincipled, replete with doctrinal anomalies [state-by-state], 
and infested with seemingly arbitrary distinctions.”106 The disparity in property treatment conflicts 
with U.S. legal history. American jurists pioneered the maxim that the power to take property from 
one private individual to give to another was against all reason and justice, and the legislative 
branch cannot be trusted with such a power.107 Nonetheless, the new American trend is not unique. 
Courts worldwide also evaluate property rights as less important than other rights.108  
History. Eminent Domain in the United States is an ancient doctrine enforceable at the 
federal, state, and local levels.109 Every government has an inherent authority to control property 




within its jurisdiction, subject to preemptive limitations:110 such as paying the losses incurred to 
the injured person.111 In Colonial America, property rights received little respect. States would 
take property if it was not fenced off and used productively.112 Under the Mill Acts, riparian 
landowners were forced to execute leases, for less than fair market value, to any person offering 
to build a grist mill along the water.113 The Founders reinvented stronger property rights than what 
was practiced in the new United States.114 The United States had to evolve over generations to 
recognize the Founder’s intended vision and for the federal constitution to become a compliance 
burden on the states.115 The states granted more protections and broader compensation methods 
than the minimum federal protections when the state or its municipalities exercise eminent 
domain.116 The federal constitution limits all expropriation actions by restricting expropriations to 
public uses (now, public purposes under the common law) by guaranteeing the landowner-
condemnee just compensation,117 and by guaranteeing due process under the law when the 
expropriator deprives the landowner of her property.118 As noted above, in the wake of Kelo, a few 
states amended their constitutions to ensure state agencies and local governments shall not abuse 
the liberal eminent domain power granted by the Supreme Court’s rulings.119 The effectiveness of 
these reform efforts may serve only as a parchment right, yielding no actual security from 
government takings.120 For example, state governments can circumvent the state’s limitations on 
taking for increasing tax revenues by using a different broad public use justification or declaring 
the subject properties as “blight.”121 If a land-use project for a private company requires more land 
than the original taking of blight property, a broad blight statute can incorporate non-blight and 
non-income-generating property into the condemnation, yielding greater tax revenues for the local 
governments.122  




The permissible justifications for private-to-private takings have drastically changed. 
Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court held a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation occurred 
when the government takes property from a private person only to convey the expropriated land 
to another private person, who can benefit from the expropriated land and exclude public access 
to the premises.123 Kelo prohibits private-to-private takings with exceptions. Private-to-private 
takings are unconstitutional when the private beneficiary of the condemnation is the only person 
benefiting from the taking124 or when a public benefit is a pretext for a purely private benefit.125 
The private beneficiary paying more property taxes or greater community employment in the 
future ensures that private-to-private transfers never solely benefit the beneficiary. The 
municipality enjoys the increased public revenue or potential job growth, or both. Kelo’s rejection 
of the narrow public use test allowed takings where it could generate an ancillary benefit to the 
public.126 Therefore, under the modern interpretation, a private entity can enjoy the immense 
benefits of the taking only if the government-expropriator acquires some kind of indirect benefit.127 
What indirect benefits qualify as de minimis remains ill-defined.128 Private-to-private 
expropriations will most likely succeed because every government entity receives tax revenues 
regardless of which private person owns the land129 unless the developer receives a tax rebate with 
the conveyance.130  
When the private party receives all the bundle of rights, privileges, liabilities, and 
immunities,131 the private-to-private taking truly promotes the private beneficiary’s interests, for 
the beneficiary incurs no additional encumbrance than if she entered a voluntary purchase –  both 
an expropriation or land-sale require annual property taxes from the end-user.132 A lower judicial 
standard of review for exercising the eminent domain power unburdens most legislative 
interpretations of a public use.133 The other reasons for granting private-to-private takings include 




the expediency at achieving the public use,134 and the removal of blight or slums that are injurious 
to the public’s health and safety.135 Purchasing the property via voluntary transactions can be more 
expensive than expropriation as well.136 The municipality may find a prospective business 
incommensurable to the land’s current use or more profitable than another business.137 In less 
populated states, eminent domain projects may promote internal migration – citizens moving to 
the different states for new employment due to the redevelopment plan – or create the preliminary 
infrastructure to access untapped state resources: e.g., refining and transporting gas. However, the 
private beneficiaries would relentlessly preserve their government-bestowed wealth to the original 
landowner’s detriment.138 Wyoming, a sparsely populated U.S. state, had a history of inequity 
when landowners confronted expropriation. “[S]urveyors would enter their property without 
permission, landmen would make low offers and threaten litigation, and projects would divide 
lands and impair views. Juries recognized these damages and would award substantial verdicts for 
the [condemnees], only to have them overturned.”139 The Wyoming Supreme Court once ordered 
a mistrial when a jury’s compensation verdict exceeded the market data for the property and 
factored the condemnee’s loss of business, subjective value of the property, and issues with 
trespassers.140 
More disconcerting is the U.S. Supreme Court’s long-standing tolerance towards a state’s 
forced sale of property that landowners would otherwise not sell.141 An important predecessor of 
Kelo was a case called Midkiff. In the Midkiff case, Hawaii enacted a law that forced large 
landowners to sell the land they were leasing to their lessees.142 The Polynesian immigrants who 
settled in Hawaii brought their feudal land tenure system to Hawaii.143 When America divided the 
feudal land to create a new U.S. state, their distribution efforts resulted in 72 people owning all of 
Hawaii’s privately owned land.144  




The former nation’s politicians had redistributed the now-American land amongst 
themselves and employed their advantageous political position to retain or acquire wealth under 
the new legal order.145 The U.S. Supreme Court held the land oligopoly – composed of the feudal 
monarchs before Hawaii became a State – created the social evil of no purchasable land in Hawaii: 
none of the 72 landowners would sell their land when they could lease it at a profit.146 Here, the 
state government is curing the politically entrenched division of land at Hawaii’s germination as a 
state.147  
The Supreme Court approved the state’s forced sale on a dubious ground: Hawaii 
expropriated land to correct a market failure or deficiency.148 This rationale transitioned the 
private-to-private taking justification from redressing a sovereignty reorganization problem to 
market forces. Dividing a former feudal or monarchial government into state land is a rare event. 
Exceptions would include the sale or competitive bidding of government land149 or when the U.S. 
acquires more land from another country. The disparity in property ownership because of market 
demand is ongoing across America.150 National Public Radio recently reported: “fewer homes for 
sale in the U.S. [in 2020] than ever recorded in data going back nearly 40 years.”151 Summarily, 
the Court permits expropriation to reduce the concentration of land ownership regardless of 
whether the landowner purchased the land without political entrenchment.152 Taking property from 
a landowner to give to a tenant in a scarce market for the tenant’s exclusive private use qualified 
as a public use.153 Thus, mere intelligent land investments, saving money to buy large parcels 
throughout many generations, or sizeable lease firms justify the government to expropriate the 
property when the landowner refuses to sell the land. The government’s reasoning finds inactivity 
in the market constitutes a market deficiency as land is not a reproducible resource, and an 
unwillingness to sell reduces the supply of land available for purchase.154 In Midkiff, the oligopoly 




had competitive pricing, so the rising consumer demand and Hawaii’s geographical constraints 
contributed to the housing shortage and significant tax implications, not alleged monopolistic 
greed.155 Unfortunately, the state could discard the actual cause or other factors impacting market 
supply, such as zoning regulations obstructing multifamily building expansions,156 and instead, 
expropriate land to promote the state’s objective.157 The state’s objective could be achieved since 
forced transfers of an unwilling seller’s land would increase the housing supply for people other 
than the landowner. Therefore, a refusal to sell affords a weak defense against private-to-private 
takings.158 Kelo cemented private-to-private takings under the broad public use test for when 
landowners refuse to sell their property to a private person for the public’s indirect benefit from 
the new private activity.159  
 
The Base Comparator: The United States & Its Constitutional Laws 
Background. Constitutional rights are considered absolute, and all future federal and 
subnational governments must enforce those rights.160 The Framers of the U.S. Constitution 
expressly decreed private property as imperative to the preservation of life, personal freedom, and 
self-determination.161 Property rights covered more natural rights than the enumerated individual 
liberties.162 The citizenry wielded a right to their property and a property interest in their rights: 
i.e., a double-layered constitutional defense.163 Constitutional rights police government actions164 
and shield individuals from those actions except when compelling interests overpowers the 
constitutional scrutiny under the metaphorical shield.165 Unlike general statutes, U.S. 
constitutional rights are difficult to alter,166 and statutory infringements on constitutional rights are 
subject to strict judicial scrutiny.167 For individuals, a constitutional protection preserves the 
individual’s best legal defense against government action168 or against parliamentary supremacy 




that could repeal the defense or circumvent the right with a new law.169 Under constitutional 
supremacy, the constitution is the supreme law of the nation that voids all contradictory laws.170 
Legislatures have regulated matters concerning constitutional rights, which debase the right’s 
absoluteness.171 However, a regulation must not destroy the constitutional guarantee.172 The 
regulation can debase rights; they must not abolish the right, but they can obstruct the right’s 
former utility. The federal constitutional rights for property are the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clauses.173 
The Takings Clause. The federal constitution’s Fifth Amendment guarantees landowners 
compensation for invasions of their property interests or deprivations of all economically 
beneficial use.174 The property can be intangible, personal, or real property.175 The Fifth 
Amendment imposed a moral obligation on the government to pay for its interference with 
privately-owned property to benefit society.176 Imposing morals counteracts the government’s 
inherent eminent domain power to take property for the public’s use or benefit.177 Property shall 
only be taken for a public use,178 but as discussed above, the public use test has been overbroad to 
allow in essence private-to-private takings, dampening the precondition’s effectiveness.179  
When one person bears the public burden by surrendering more than what is expected from 
other members of the public, the government must indemnify the landowner with a full and just 
compensation award.180 Traditionally, the true value of the land must be paid with compound 
interest to compensate delaying the expropriation, which devalues the property and deters further 
land productivity.181 The modern trend holds a just amount of compensation as dependent on 
equitable principles and fairness, not conclusively full market value.182 The landowner’s property 
rights are satisfied after the price of the taking is received, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 




standard.183 The U.S. government has counterargued that the full indemnity can constitute a 
manifest injustice.184  
Landowners can claim a federal and state constitutional violation of their right to 
compensation, although state courts can only issue a binding answer to the state constitutional law 
question.185 The federal constitution’s mandate for just compensation applies to state or local 
governments exercising an eminent domain power.186 The economic impact of regulations on 
property could cause an injury that warrants compensation for equity and fairness purposes.187 
Failing to compensate landowners for the state’s economic injuries, such as regulatory takings, 
may create a taking if the landowner bears a particularized loss at society’s alleged benefit.188 
Property interferences can oblige compensation in only extreme circumstances, and the norm 
affords great deference to land-use regulations without compensation for reduced land values, 
business loses, or relocation costs.189 Repealing an ordinance that stopped the landowner’s 
economic activity on the property or returning the property to the landowner makes the once-
permanent taking temporary.190 Temporary takings complaints rectify the landowner’s deprived 
time to use and profit from the land.191 There is no definite formula to compute temporary 
takings.192 
The Due Process Clauses. Before 2019, landowners suing a state or local government for 
a federal constitutional violation had to exhaust all state law remedies and procedures before 
litigating in federal court.193 Often, state proceedings would exhaust the landowner with excessive 
court costs and time.194 Suppose the claim was defeated in state court, the federal court could not 
answer the landowner’s federal Fifth Amendment question under res judicata: which bars the 
relitigation of a proceeding that a court has already heard and decided.195 To end the procedural 




impasse, in 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court granted landowners the option to sue state officials 
directly in Federal District Court for deprivation of their federal constitutional property rights.196  
At the surface, the U.S. considers property and liberty as equally worthy of procedural due 
process protections under the federal constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.197 
However, the modern trend affords fewer safeguards for property compared to other freedoms.198 
The federal constitution’s Due Process Clauses command the creation of a fair procedure or an 
opportunity for a hearing.199 Both are orthodox, practical principles to defend property interests in 
a common law system,200  but the Due Process Clauses cannot halt all state procedural injustices.201 
For example, the state government’s failure to give an interested party notice of a hearing resulting 
in the property value declining did not qualify as a deprivation of property without due process.202 
What is lawful does not make the action culturally accepted. Many state courts create common 
law procedural rules when the state legislature abstains from enacting notice requirements or pre-
condemnation hearings.203 State law formulates the elements of property within its jurisdiction,204 
and to benefit all landowners, states cannot abolish a right to property arbitrarily or contravene the 
fundamental rights to property and justice.205 
 
The State & Local Protections. Whether a state supplemented the federal constitutional 
protections under their state constitutions or through a state statute, the legal protection’s position 
in the legal hierarchy impacts its permanency and exposure to alterations.   
Constitutions. Each state has particularized defenses and remedies in their Constitutions, 
and their effectiveness of pro-landowner defenses deviate from state-to-state. For illustration, 
Louisiana’s constitution deters the Kelo ruling by prohibiting private-to-private transactions and 
expropriations for a predominantly private use or for enhancing tax revenues.206 However, 




expropriations for the benefit of private entities persist when the expropriation to the private entity 
eliminates blight property.207 In some states, a landowner could request a jury to adjudicate the 
justness of the compensation award, and just compensation could extend beyond the federal 
constitutional standard with the addition of relocation and inconvenience costs.208 The Michigan 
Constitution demands compensation to be no less than 125% of the expropriated land’s fair market 
value,209 the Virginia Constitution grants compensation for lost profits and lost access to the 
land,210 and the Montana Constitution allows landowners to recover attorney fees, expert witness 
fees, exhibit costs, and court costs as compensation if the court rules in favor of the landowner’s 
claim, e.g. challenging the exercise of eminent domain or the compensation award.211 Besides 
these remarkable states, the majority of state constitutions reiterate the federal constitution’s Fifth 
Amendment protection without supplementing the standard in favor of landowners.212 Even in the 
brief history when some states did not have a constitutional right to property and the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not force the Takings Clause on the states, the common law upheld a 
compensation requirement with the exception of South Carolina.213 
State laws that directly conflict with the federal constitution are unconstitutional given 
federal preemption of state law.214 If a State fails to furnish just compensation, due process, or 
equal treatment rights, then no independent state constitutional analysis can avoid the prima facie 
conflict with the federal constitution.215 In First English Lutheran Church of Glendale, the 
California court found a municipal ordinance authorizing an expropriation to be unconstitutional, 
but the government failed to compensate the landowners for the temporary taking.216 Voiding an 
unconstitutional taking ordinance is not an adequate federal remedy for expropriations.217 The 
government must pay compensation for the temporary taking because it conducted work on the 
land, stopping all economic viable uses, pursuant to that voided ordinance.218 A State that enacts 




more liberties than the federal constitution cures the defects of the federal constitution, such as the 
inequities generated under a broader public use interpretation.219 Therefore, supplementing federal 
constitutional rights without abating those federal rights synchronizes federal and state laws 
towards a unified principle of preserving property rights.220  
Other Compensation Factors. A government actor controlling the land without paying 
compensation allows the landowner to recover trespass damages,221 and compensation in eminent 
domain.222 A court may reject a trespass claim under the state’s sovereign immunity or a 
legislatively recognized inverse condemnation statute, which creates a separate action with fewer 
landowner remedies.223 Nevertheless, practitioners could argue that private entities condemning or 
benefiting from the condemnation lack an eminent domain power, state sovereign immunity, or 
both.224 The landowner would petition for an ultra vires review of the private entity’s conformity 
with their legislatively granted authority.225  
Landowners can enroll in relocation assistance programs at the federal or state level, if 
eligible, to reimburse moving expenses,226 reestablish a relocated business227 or replace a 
residence.228 The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 
1970 promogulated non-binding best practices for federal agencies or federally funded projects 
displacing landowners.229 Landowners have no rights or cause of action when an agency fails to 
comply with the policies.230 When a state mirrors the Act’s provision and excludes that disclaimer 
limiting the landowner’s rights, the state agency is obligated to comply with all the best 
practices,231 or a state court could interpret the Act’s disclaimer as limited to the Act’s moving and 
replacement housing expenses.232 States relocation assistance includes relinquishing commercial 
property or alternative housing.233 Moreover, a Federal Agency should not accept property from a 
State234 unless the Federal Agency reimbursed the landowner for her legal costs to transfer the 




property, any penalties on existing mortgages,235 and possibly litigation and attorney fees.236 The 
Agency must attempt to comply with the Congressional policy on eminent domain practices, even 
when it relies on the State’s eminent domain power.237 Analogously, a State cannot receive federal 
funds for the eminent domain project238 unless, when requested, the State reimbursed the 
landowner’s moving expenses, searching costs for a replacement business or farm, replacement 
housing, and legal costs for purchasing or entering the replacement dwelling.239 At its discretion, 
the State may provide relocation services to landowners abutting the project who will incur a 
substantial economic injury from the project.240 
Alabama & the Eminent Domain Code. Alabama ratified the Model Eminent Domain 
Code241 and other rules that resulted in Alabama being ranked first in land-use freedom.242  
Alabama is less likely to use eminent domain than many other regions in the United States,243 it 
banned economic, private eminent domain rationales, and it restricted the definition of blight 
despite having no history of private-to-private takings.244 With the intent of overturning Kelo and 
Midkiff, the Alabama legislature made the following public uses impermissible: condemning 
property for future “retail, office, commercial, residential, or industrial development or use[;]”245 
enhancing tax revenues; and transferring property to private persons.246 The trickle-down benefits 
of economic developments fail to satisfy the state constitutional public use precondition.247 
Whether a property constitutes blight is a parcel-by-parcel question;248 otherwise, a landowner 
who complied with the building laws would receive the same punishment as her recalcitrant 
neighbor.249  
Other state outliers outshine Alabama’s high-ranking eminent domain reforms. Florida and 
New Mexico banned the local government’s eminent domain power to eliminate blighted 
property,250 where Florida promotes the local government’s inherent power-to-abate-nuisances to 




combat health and safety issues instead of the eminent domain power.251 Commentators also 
concluded that Alabama’s blight definition is not sufficiently restrictive to stop Kelo-style 
takings.252 Alabama follows the majority rule that does not exempt agriculture from zoning 
regulation and fails to preserve agricultural land as widely as other states.253 Compare that to 
Kansas where agricultural land is exempt from most zoning requirements,254 and Oregon where 
farmland and its structures are given preferential treatment over urban planning.255 Oregon statutes 
compensate for the reduction in fair market value caused by regulations for residential, farming, 
and forestry activities.256 Compensation previously applied to all Oregon properties, but the 
legislature amended the statute to exclude commercial properties.257 Nonexclusive agricultural 
preservation zoning is preferable since the landowner can build structures on the land without 
issue, incur less administrative costs than exclusive agricultural zoning, and voluntarily change the 
land’s zoning if the nonfarm uses outbalance the land’s agricultural use.258 If Alabamian local 
governments enforced their power-to-abate-nuisances instead of using the eminent domain power, 
the “right to farm” nuisance exemption would protect more farmers from expropriation due to their 
operations being alleged nuisances.259 Alabama rarely expropriates farmland, but under those 
circumstances, the courts would deny entry onto any farmland until the crops were harvested,260 
or the landowner was reimbursed for the destruction.261 
Regulatory Takings. Richard Epstein’s book, Takings, discussed the injustice of 
expropriating property without compensating for the condemnee’s other losses derived from the 
taking.262 Alabama’s Constitution fails to remedy all consequential damages, but the landowner 
and abutting landowners can sue municipalities for inverse condemnation when the government 
takes or injures any other private property during an expropriation or public improvement.263 
However, unlike most states, the Alabama Supreme Court does not extend the protection to 




regulatory takings264 unless the regulation caused a physical taking, injury, or destruction of the 
property.265 For instance, government-contracted construction of a breakwater and marsh that 
killed the farmers’ shoreline oysters – due to excess sediment and silt deposits – produced a 
compensable injury against chattels and the existing shoreline easement.266 The Alabama 
Constitution and U.S. Constitution are worded differently, but the Alabama Supreme Court saw 
no reason to deviate from the federal doctrine, which repudiates regulatory takings as 
compensable.267  
The Alabama Supreme Court strictly construed that landowners cannot recover 
compensation for the property’s restricted use without a statute providing compensation for the 
government’s exercise of the zoning power.268 Compare Alabama to Florida, where Floridian 
courts treat economically debilitating regulations269 and blocking travel for certain vehicles270 as 
compensable regulatory takings. Likewise, forcing landowners to confer a public benefit qualifies 
as a taking.271 In North Dakota, a landowner who undertakes significant expenditures improving 
her property, in reliance upon existing zoning laws, may petition for compensation when the new 
zoning regulations forbid all reasonable use of the property.272 Losing a property’s economically 
viable use has become a state-by-state question into whether the State law recognizes the specific 
property interest that has lost some or all of its economic value.273 
Quick-takings274 are common, but the expropriator must pay a court bond of the court-
estimated injury to the property and substantial interference of the landowner’s possession and use 
of the property.275 The bond should fund the landowner’s restoration efforts and court costs if she 
wins on appeal. If the expropriator prevails in the Circuit Court’s condemnation order, the 
expropriator may survey, construct, and use the land for the stated public purpose despite the 
landowner appealing the order.276 The expropriator will need to pay the assessed compensation 




before using the property with imperfect title.277 Landowners should seek compensation for the 
delayed compensation payment, when an appeal is raised, through prejudgment interests.278  
Public use is limited to the public’s use. Historically, private ownership of a public work 
invoked an unconstitutional private use, and the legislature could not convert a private use into a 
public use by legislative order.279 The Alabama Courts mandated that a public use must mean 
either (1) the public can use the expropriated land, or (2) the public can have the privilege of 
enjoying the expropriated land.280 A statute authorizing road construction was held 
unconstitutional when the road was predominately for a private benefit, although the public had 
access to the road.281 In another case, a company responsible for supplying water to a city could 
not divert water from the river, which supplied the city water, without compensating riparian 
landowners.282 The substantial amount of diverted water impaired the downstream landowners 
who would have had the right to use that water.283 This suggests that public access is not exempted 
from a defense against excessive trespass when a private beneficiary is operating a public work.  
For greater clarity, the Alabama Supreme Court’s advisory opinion affirmed that a 
primarily collateral and incidental public benefit fails the public use test.284 Public utilities, which 
may be privatized, can benefit everyone in the community, not exclusive to corporate stakeholders 
or employees.285 The private use is less vague with only specified universal utilities acquiring the 
power, and the Alabama Supreme Court advises strict preconditions when the legislature delegates 
the eminent domain powers to public utilities.286 For example, a common carrier pipeline 
precludes an argument that the pipeline is for a private use, such as transporting natural gas 
between sister corporations.287 Arizona, Virginia, and Wyoming permit privately operated utilities 
as a public use and simultaneously employ the traditional standard: actual possession, occupation, 
and enjoyment by a public agency or the general public.288 




In summary, Alabama has later embraced the elastic, indefinite interpretation of public use 
despite its muddled history.289 Alabama’s liberal interpretation still leans towards a stricter, 
narrower public use standard and blight test in the national survey. Although Alabama is the top-
ranked land-use state, its substantive law can improve from mirroring its sister states. Alabama 
could adopt more restrictive eminent domain reform laws, like Oregon’s regulatory takings statute 
or Florida’s ban on blight, or it could revive its traditional public use standard. Alabama could 
bind inverse condemnation claims with the State constitution’s compensation clause, 
compensating for general damages and injuries to property.290 The history of the Alabama and 
U.S. constitutions never foresaw how zoning laws would endanger property rights like the ancient 
eminent domain power.291 The Alabama Supreme Court quoted New York Justice Bronson in 
explaining why the judiciary should strongly check the legislature:  
[I]f the legislature or the courts undertake to cure defects by forced and unnatural 
constructions, they inflict a wound upon the constitution which nothing can heal. 
One step taken by the legislature or the judiciary, in enlarging the powers of the 
government, opens the door for another, which will be sure to follow; and so the 
process goes on, until all respect for the fundamental law is lost … .292 
 
We are at the juncture that Justice Bronson warned. The legislature molded zoning and created 
innovative regulations to bypass cumbersome eminent domain procedures as a compromise than 
a respect for property rights. This opens the door to property injuries and encumbrances without 
compensation or due process. Alabama compensating regulatory takings would respect the spirit 
and drafting limitation of its constitution to redress the law’s evolution impinging property rights. 
Generally, if Alabama wishes to create a more liberal interpretation of its law, the courts should 
interpret its compensation clauses293 as independent of the federal jurisprudence, making similarly 
worded provisions covering situations beyond the federal counterpart.294 




State Compensation. The Alabama Eminent Domain Code compensates the property’s 
fair market value without adjusting the property’s value for the public work’s degradation or 
improvement to the land.295 Many legislatures detest eminent domain abuse and the wasting of the 
landowner’s time. Connecticut, Michigan, Missouri, and Indiana define “just compensation” as an 
amount exceeding the property’s fair market value to further these objectives.296 Missouri pays the 
loss of familial heritage in addition to the 125% fair market value compensation award on the 
homestead.297 Heritage value refers to properties owned and used within the same family for fifty 
or more years that can no longer be used after the condemnation.298 The bonus payment to a 
compensation award can discourage the government from expropriating the neighboring 
properties, at lower market values, soon after the original condemnation.299 In Connecticut, a 
government agency would need to pay an additional 5% of the fair market value to neighboring 
landowners between six to ten years after taking the first parcel.300 The agency must expropriate 
all the necessary land within a few years or incur a delay penalty, which probably reflects the drop 
in market value for adjacent lands threatened with eminent domain.  
Alabama offers additional condemnation benefits. Once the state or local governments no 
longer need the expropriated land, they cannot sell the land without first giving notice to the 
condemnee, or her heirs, of their right to buy back the land at the price of the condemnation award, 
minus taxes.301  If the condemnee litigates the expropriation, the expropriator must pay the 
condemnee’s litigation expenses if the condemnee succeeds in-part or in-full;302 however, settling 
for a prescriptive easement, instead of negotiating for a smaller right-of-way condemnation, may 
bar the condemnee’s cost recovery altogether.303 The state agencies, but not local governments,304 
must pay relocation payments not exceeding $31,000 under the Eminent Domain Code305 or 
relocation costs under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies 




Act of 1970 if applicable.306 Business owners cannot recover the destruction of their Alabamian 
business,307 even though less economically free states obligate compensation for the lost 
goodwill308 or the lost business use for the remaining property.309 On occasions, Alabama courts 
adjusted the property’s fair market value after considering the lost future business profits, but 
there’s no guarantee.310 A practitioner could convincingly argue the landowner should be 
compensated for the market value of lost business interest: leasehold, standing crops, and mineral 
rights.311 
Stare decisis makes the cost of legal decision-making low and predictable; however, 
ignoring constitutional rights should not be accepted due to mere neglect or tolerance of the status 
quo in the State’s jurisprudence.312 Erroneous constitutional interpretations undermine the 
constitutions’ intent to safeguard private property and make future corrections difficult and time-
consuming.313 The inconvenience in allowing the State residents to amend their constitution and 
allow certain private-to-private eminent domain transfer going forward far exceeds the risk of 
derogating constitutional rights as the legislature and judiciary cures the legal inconveniences of 
strict eminent domain laws.314  
 Conclusion. The U.S. has many great protections spread across many states rather than 
any one state. The strong deference to the legislature and inconsistent eminent domain expectations 
may undermine the good qualities inherent and circulated throughout the country. With a helpful 
background in U.S. eminent domain law, Chapters 3 through 5 will analyze the intricacies of 
eminent domain law in Singapore, New Zealand, and Switzerland. These chapters will analyze the 
constitutional and legislative authority surrounding each Studied Nation’s eminent domain power. 
Furthermore, the compensation package in each nation is reviewed to determine if it eases the 
burden on the displaced landowners. A complete replacement property could be a superior remedy, 




but land scarcity in smaller countries makes such a replacement impossible. If other nations aspire 
to replicate the top-ranking nations on property rights, the remedy should be feasible for other 
countries to emulate, regardless of geographic constraints. 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 –  SINGAPORE’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS & 
FUNDAMENTAL EMINENT DOMAIN PRINCIPLES 
 This chapter will review the constitutional and statutory protections concerning 
expropriations, known as land acquisitions, in Singapore. The available defenses for landowners 
and the compensation package for expropriations are consolidated and analyzed to show a 
landowner’s expectations in the event of expropriation.  
Property. The Singapore Constitution contains the most authoritative rights in the nation, 
following constitutional supremacy.315 Singapore intentionally omitted a right to property in its 
constitution,316 declaring the right onerous to the development of the resource-deficient city-
state.317 Singapore’s founding father, Lee Kuan Yew,318 argued that a constitutional amendment 
guaranteeing compensation for expropriations would flood the courts with countless cases 
questioning the adequacy of the compensation.319 The first administration intended to expropriate 
much of the land to fulfill its vision of Singaporean economic success.320 Dissimilar to the United 
States, Singapore has been less concerned about procedural protections from government 
corruption affecting property rights and more devoted to advancing their public policy objectives 
through expropriations.321  
At the start of the twentieth century, U.S. scholar, Christopher Tiedeman, acknowledged 
that land scarcity accompanied by overpopulation would convert an unconstitutional private-to-
private taking into a public necessity.322 An acceptable private-to-private taking has caveats. 




Tiedeman exempted farmland and industrial land that appears spacious and vacant because 
landowners expend capital and labor on the property throughout the year.323 Meanwhile, Singapore 
has confiscated farmland opting for reliance on food imports with the intention of replacing 
farmland with vertical, urban farming.324  
Due Process & the Right to Contract. The complementary right to contract also suffered 
a similar fate as the right to property.325 Singapore has no clause precluding the government’s 
impairment of contractual obligations, as found in the U.S.326 The U.S. contracts clause rarely 
interferes with the government’s eminent domain powers327 and, yet, the constitution’s prohibition 
on the impairment of contracts has safeguarded creditors – an economic minority – from being 
targets of expropriations.328 A Singaporean contracts clause could have opened an alternative 
approach to question land acquisitions. Contracts are a property interest that is condemnable for a 
public use,329 and expropriations distort sale-of-land contracts. No frustration of contract arises 
when the government issues a declaration to expropriation before the sale-of-land contract’s 
completion date.330 The buyer will receive useable land until the acquisition, a compensation award 
that will return the buyer’s purchase price for the land, and possibly a new 99-year leasehold – the 
buyer could receive an ex gratia payment in this situation.331 Parties default land sale contracts in 
contemplation of expropriation because either compensation gains outweigh the contract damages 
or losing the land encourages reneging on the contracts. A liquidated damages clause or a specific 
performance order should provide these victims with a remedy against the unjust enrichment 
caused by the foreseeable land acquisition and consequential contract breaches.332 
Singapore Courts have not interpreted their constitutional due process clause as broadly as 
the U.S. The United States’ constitutional due process clause expressly declares life, liberty, and 
property as protected under the fair procedures and impartial decision-making provision.333 The 




traditional meaning of “liberty” embodied fair procedures for the right to contract and the right to 
worship, although preceding clauses protected those interests.334 Singapore’s constitution states 
“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law.”335 
Although property is not mentioned, the Singapore Courts will not interpret a right to contract as 
a personal liberty and have converted contract issues affecting property into non-constitutional 
property issues.336 The Courts view the U.S. due process clauses as materially distinguishable 
because the Singapore Constitution grants Parliament almost absolute discretion to make laws 
affecting personal liberty.337 Singapore’s reluctance to accept the United States’ expansive 
interpretation of liberty may derive from its fear of flooding the courts with questions about the 
constitutional scope of individual autonomy and other claims conferring the right of personal 
liberty.338  
Singapore courts have the power to invalidate laws that violate constitutional norms,339 but 
the constitution leaves property or contract rights unguarded. The Courts also cannot redress or 
alter pleadings about procedural inequities.340 Once Parliament passes a law and the applicable 
agency complies with that law, depriving a person of her liberties may be constitutional.341 The 
Courts publish a unified voice as they follow a strict philosophy respecting Singapore’s democratic 
self-governance.342 In stark contrast to the U.S. and New Zealand, the Courts have restrained the 
application of broad terms within existing rights that could potentially produce unenumerated 
rights favoring the political or intrinsic values of the judge or litigants.343  
The Singaporean judiciary faithfully interprets the Singapore Constitution to deflect any 
conversion of the judiciary into a political institution.344 The judiciary rarely looks to other 
international legal interpretations as persuasive evidence because Parliament can amend the 
constitution with two-thirds majority, which has not bottlenecked amendments over the past 




decade.345 The judiciary has persistently disallowed any inherent right to property, but it does find 
other constitutional rights within property interests. In Eng Foong Ho, the court found the state-
ordered disposition of religious property could be unconstitutionally discriminatory if the 
government selected the expropriation site based on the owner’s religion, race, place of birth, or 
descent.346 The same reasoning may apply to overassessing one taxpayer compared to other 
similarly situated taxpayers.347 Nonetheless, the judiciary nurtured a robust property and contract 
system accredited worldwide without the constitution guaranteeing those systems as the country’s 
culture evolves or when the one-party-rule since 1959 ends.348 
Equal Protection. Singapore’s constitutional equal protection clause does defend citizens 
from unfair treatment or government action against their property interests based on religion, race, 
place of birth, or descent.349 A legal practitioner would advise not to purchase land near public 
works as the Government’s most important justification when expropriating is how the land 
adjacent to State land can benefit the development projects.350 For a religious discrimination case, 
the plaintiff defending the religious land or historical site would need to show inequality in the 
government’s decision-making or prima facie discriminatory legislation.351 Picking one religious 
site instead of another religious site, errors of judgment, and inadvertences are not conclusive 
evidence of an equal protection violation.352 Singaporean case law has confirmed that the absence 
of a constitutional property right denies landowners any separate compensatory remedy for a 
breach of natural justice or a breach of a statutory procedure.353 In effect, the constitution’s equal 
protection clause fails to defend landowners or repair their spiritual loss.  
A landowner cannot claim a constitutional equal protection violation as a result of receiving 
a reduced compensation award compared to someone else unless the landowner can substantiate 
that the properties were alike when the expropriated land was assessed for compensation 




purposes.354 In the en bloc sale of a condominium, the Strata Title Board could constitutionally 
compel the sale of units in a Condominium when a minority of subsidiary proprietors rejected the 
sale.355 Without a right to contract or property, a majority vote of the condominium owners can 
coerce the minority of subsidiary proprietors to dispose of their land.356 The minority proprietors 
may recover for any financial losses incurred as a result of the en bloc sale.357 Singapore also taxes 
landowners varyingly, punishing vacant landowners with a higher property tax to discourage the 
hoarding of unproductive land.358 Unlike Midkiff, where the landowner was given the property 
through a change in sovereignty, property tax assessors can punish Singaporeans for accumulating 
land regardless of diligent savings, property management, or the deficit in local demand.359 Only 
a few individuals owned Singaporean land at the country’s founding, similar to Hawaii’s 
statehood; however, Singapore punished future private land accumulation without considering 
how the land was acquired.360 
The Land Acquisition Act. All the land ultimately belongs to Singapore.361 Fee simple 
ownership is subject to exceptions and conditions expressed or implied in the land transfer or by 
law as amended at any time.362 The government’s decision to confiscate is not a justiciable question 
without showing the government’s bad faith, fraud, or lack of authority.363 The Land Acquisition 
Act of 1966 (hereafter the “LAA”) was promogulated to protect the landowners who already had 
a scarce amount of private land and to serve the public’s interest with few restraints.364 Singapore’s 
State Advocate-General found land acquisition bills to conflict with a proposed constitutional 
guarantee of adequate compensation if the constitutional guarantees were adopted.365 Even if 
Singapore ratified a constitutional property right, Parliament would have been advised to draft a 
constitutional exception for the land acquisition bills to dismiss complaints concerning the 
compensation amount, nullifying compensation’s efficacy.366   




Constitutional property law should restrain governmental power over something within its 
jurisdiction,367 but the Singaporean Government can subdue most restrictions with a notice, called 
a declaration. Sections 5 of the LAA makes this notice of acquisition “conclusive evidence that 
the land is needed for the purpose written on the notice.”368 Private-to-private takings qualify as a 
public purpose if the Minister of Law finds the work beneficiary to the public or a public utility.369 
Known as an ouster clause, Parliament may prima facie prohibit judicial review of a regulatory 
agency’s discretionary acquisition power.370 The Courts usually do not question the merits of the 
Singaporean President’s land acquisitions and the Ministry of National Development agencies’ 
final land-use decision.371 
According to the Singapore Court of Appeals, the agency’s declaration commences the 
expropriation that “will lead almost with absolute certainty to divesting the owner of his title to 
the land and vesting it in the State.”372 The government alleges a public benefit, but the government 
does not need to consult the impacted community for recommendations or seek its participation.373 
A landowner can prove an expropriation is unlawful only if (1) the government misconstrued its 
statutory authority, (2) the LAA notice fails to meet a purpose specified in the LAA, or (3) the 
purpose declared on the notice is baseless due to bad faith or an ulterior objective.374 Moreover, 
the Courts intervene when the competent agency exceeds its authority with unreasonable 
conditions on the landowner.375 The landowner’s arduous burden under this interpretation has led 
to outlandish results in Singapore and its former parent country: Malaysia:376  
1. Merely acquiring thousands of acres of land beyond the original requirements for the 
project does not demonstrate bad faith or a secondary pretextual purpose for acquiring 
4,000 more acres of land than was necessary.377 The government can hoard land without 
penalty. 




2. An adverse possessor who occupied a house on the property for decades was not entitled 
to any compensation for the lack of notice or breach of natural justice.378 The government 
provided a small ex gratia payment to help the adverse possessor relocate.379 
3. No bad faith was found despite the Collector of Land Revenue’s failure to inspect the land 
under LAA. The land had a house, and the Collector failed to discover the house was 
subject to the land acquisition plan, which would have impacted the compensation 
award.380   
4. Changing the public purpose does not evidence bad faith, even if there was no legitimate 
public purpose at the start of the proceeding.381 The bad faith outcomes could be evidenced 
indirectly. A prolonged, unexplained period of inactivity (22 years) may establish sufficient 
evidence of bad faith or that the land was not needed for the stated public purpose. 
However, an ex-post investigation created no immediate action for the displaced 
landowners, even though the landowners must wait for the prolonged inactivity and absent 
explanation before raising a complaint of bad faith.382 
Consequently, proprietors are at the mercy of the government to withdraw the acquisition, which 
is rare.383 Given that the government can expropriate land “for any residential, commercial or 
industrial purposes[,]”384 the Collector of Land Revenue acquires property with the intention of 
selling the property to a private developer.385 “Even then, [the Judge] would have thought that 
there would still be an element of public purpose since such a sale would have been effected with 
[the expectation of] putting the entire surrounding physical environment to its best use.”386 Since 
one landowner could be more productive with the property, the private-to-private taking serves the 
best public purpose. The Court of Appeals has suggested that government agencies profiting from 
private-to-private acquisitions would face unfavorable judicial review while the private 




beneficiary of the private-to-private acquisition is left unscathed.387 The government has 
successfully leased the condemned property back to the original landowners or allowed private 
development under the guise of a future public work plan.388 These judgments complement the 
LAA, which allows taking land for the need of a private person or corporation.389 Unlike the United 
States’ eminent domain reform, Singapore enforces urban renewal, redevelopment, and 
rejuvenation as the cornerstones of land acquisition given the country’s small geography.390 One 
landowner unsuccessfully attempted to develop the property and take measures to improve the 
land in order to avoid expropriation, but a landowner’s curative measures cannot discontinue the 
government’s grander development plans.391   
Compensation. Since 2007, compensation amounts to the land’s fair market value at the 
time of acquisition: the publication date of the public purpose or notification to conduct surveys 
or preliminary work.392 Before 2007, government agencies were expropriating property at cheap, 
backdated prices spanning many years within a land-deficient country.393 Land values appreciate 
in land-scarce growing economies, so the government’s compulsory purchases at decade-old 
prices yielded a substantial discount for Singapore.394 The government’s sentiment shifted as it 
paid more for the acquired lands out of a moral obligation through ex-gratia payments, which are 
not legally guaranteed or enforceable precedent.395 The government offered ex-gratia payments 
when more individuals suffer a financial hardship by the expropriation, when entities relinquish 
storefronts and fixtures,396 when market value considerably exceeded the statutory compensation 
award, and when there was government error – computing compensation at $1 for declared 
nominal rezoning.397  
In Mustaq Ahmad,398 the government expropriated the land while a landowner was 
developing his property; the government had to compensate for the lost permission to develop the 




land and the improvements that the government would benefit from after the expropriation.399 In 
other cases, the government reduced the landowner’s compensation award by the land’s 
depreciation caused by the government’s public purpose or zoning announcement,400 even though 
the courts historically acknowledged that foreseeable, hard-to-appeal expropriations lower market 
prices.401 The Court of Appeals reasoned that excluding the land’s depreciation would increase 
litigation and thwart the government’s budget when implementing land acquisitions, regardless of 
any detriment to the landowner.402 Parliament is deemed responsible for rectifying the hardship, 
not the courts, yet deference to Parliament has produced no solution.403 The Court of Appeals 
failed to consider how:  
(1) the government could politically profit from the reduced condemnation awards at the 
landowner’s detriment,  
(2) the government had to spend more time computing and heralding the detrimental public 
purpose’s effect on the property value to discount the compensation award, and  
(3) Parliament did not expressly or impliedly penalize landowners for the acquisition notice 
undervaluing the property.404  
Compensation awards have been regressed in other areas. Landowners have no compensation 
claim for the diminution of their property’s value caused by land-use regulation.405 The 
government may issue an ex-gratia payment if the harm from zoning creates public headlines or 
egregious inequity.406 Verifiable lost earnings are unrecoverable, and a landowner preparing too 
early to relocate because of a future condemnation may fail to recover the relocation costs.407 The 
early relocation expenses must be incidental in time, unpremeditated to the landowner’s inevitable 
move due to the expropriation.408 Any indication that the landowner would cease its business 
operations after the acquisition restricted the collection of removal expenses.409 Singapore’s 




compensation philosophy prioritizes public purposes and public finances to prevail over private 
financial interests.410 Therefore, optimizing public resources at the lowest cost will easily outweigh 
the landowner’s interests, even when the landowner mitigates the expropriation’s hardship through 
proactive measures.411 
 The Malaysian Connection. Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965 due to “ethnic 
and political tensions” in Malaysia.412 The Singapore Courts, which were formerly governed by 
the Federal Court of Malaysia,413 find Malaysian case law to be “a helpful reference point”414 or 
authoritative415 given the similar legislation and legal systems between the two countries.416 The 
Malaysian Constitution remains binding in Singaporean jurisprudence, as amended to conform 
with Singapore law, except for the Malaysian Constitution’s right to property.417 The Malaysian 
Constitution may furnish superficial protection, even if Singapore adopted the Malaysian 
Constitution’s right to property via the Singaporean Constitution, Independence Act, or common 
law. The State owns almost all the land in Malaysia,418 the public purpose statute matches the 
breadth of Singapore’s LAA,419 the State’s compliance with Malaysia’s Land Acquisition Act 
prohibits landowners from challenging the constitutionality of the State’s procedure.420 The 
expropriation becomes invalidated if commencing the expropriation process is dilatory.421 
Otherwise, many Malaysian cases reach identical conclusions to the Singapore courts.422 
 Final Remarks. Historically, the Singapore property regime has been construed against 
the landowner; however, in recent times, Singaporean land has been safe from expropriations due 
to the government’s inactivity. From 2011 through 2020, Singapore’s President has only issued 46 
Public Purpose Declarations, with many Declarations recording only a couple of lot numbers.423 
The literature – the WEF Survey and economic freedom indices – may deduce that Singapore 
strongly enforced property rights because the government has been expropriating less land than at 




the nation’s founding.424 By 1979, Singapore had expropriated a two-thirds of the country to 
develop public housing.425 Presently, the Singapore government owns over 90% of the nation’s 
surface rights with dwindling quantities of privately owned land.426 The current property rights 
rankings are skewed. Singapore respects its leaseholds and contract law; however, it has exercised 
control over private ownership in earlier years without question. The American Bill of Rights is 
mostly absent in Singapore’s jurisprudence, yet paradoxically, Singapore achieved great prosperity 
without enacting fundamental American rights and without adopting auxiliary wealth 
redistribution schemes alongside its centrally-planned property regime.427 In practice, a country 
that preserves property and contract rights, without constitutional protections, provides serviceable 
property safeguards than a country with constitutional protections that fails to enforce that rule of 
law.428 Singapore’s culture may explain the discrepancy in landowner treatment. Hofstede Insights 
has measured the cultural and behavioral differences in countries worldwide for international 
business.429 It found that Singaporean culture accepts a power hierarchy by putting society above 
the individual as a democratic value.430 Americans have a greater tendency to focus on winning 
and looking after themselves.431 With no expectation of a third-party support network,432 
expropriated Americans must consider how they can optimize their personal situation in the face 
of losing their house or business. Singapore values community and familial support during 
hardships with a focus on modesty and consensus instead of winning-comes-first.433 Singaporeans 
could generally view expropriations as societal progress while Americans treat eminent domain as 
a personal threat without a secure safety net.    
The LAA’s objectives are (1) landowners could not profit from the expropriation, (2) the 
government could pay below fair market value for the mass acquisitions through statutory price 
freezing, and (3) the acquisition price should not account for high land values caused by the 




government implementing the public purpose or neighboring public purposes.434 This acquisition 
regime deviated drastically compared to other top-ranking nations. The government determines 
the compensation, which can be assessed below fair market value, and favor private developers 
with the limitation on what may qualify as compensatory damages to the landowner.435 Almost 
anything the government declares as a “public purpose” is conclusive evidence of a public 
purpose.436 The Singaporean regime satisfies the desires of Singapore’s founding fathers: to have 
government urban renewal and rural development without equitable limitations for landowners.437  
In conclusion, Singapore has an above-average system that protects property in an 
unconventional manner. Singapore has no express property rights, and its critics have reported the 
government biases affecting the administration of justice.438 The courts refuse to question 
legislative or executive operations. The government has not resolved the absolutist discretion 
bestowed to government agencies, probably due to Singapore’s political stability and 
consistency.439 The Singaporean Prime Minister, Leader of the House, and ministers of the 
regulatory state have been members of the People’s Action Party since Singapore’s conception. If 
an opponent of the People’s Action Party were to achieve majority votes, the opponent would 
deploy the broad legal mechanisms bestowed to the existing regulatory agencies to enforce its 
ideology.440 Traditionally, a smaller country without local governance to restrict the 
nationalization of public policy could foster oppressive majoritarian views to become law.441 It’s 
easier to corrupt a city than a continent comprised of equally important small governments.442 
Future research will determine whether the People’s Action Party will accept legalism once its 
opposition controls the obdurately overbroad discretion.443 Likewise, the courts’ resilient 
deference to Parliament and agencies may dissipate when new political leadership is reviewed for 
expropriation abuse.444 





CHAPTER 4 – NEW ZEALAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS & 
FUNDAMENTAL EMINENT DOMAIN PRINCIPLES 
 This chapter will cover some of the authoritative legal instruments that landowners have 
used to protect their lands from expropriation. The Public Works Act 1981 governs expropriations, 
known as compulsory acquisitions, and many other Acts cross-reference the Public Works Act 
when an expropriation fulfills the aims of the legislation.445  
New Zealand does not have a conventional constitution that is the supreme law of the 
land,446 but rather statutes in the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“Bill of Rights”) that offer protections.447 
New Zealand is a unitary state – lacking states that significantly scatter power outside the capital 
city – without entrenched quasi-constitutional rights.448 The New Zealand Parliament denied an 
express guarantee of property rights in the Bill of Rights on three occasions.449 The omission also 
deprives those pursuing economic rights of any authoritative defenses.450 The New Zealand courts 
have not acknowledged a right to property equivalent to the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth 
Amendment.451 If Parliament desired a constitutional right to property, New Zealand has the 
easiest constitution to amend, compared to the thirty-nine studied constitutional democracies, 
because Parliament can revoke any right and the entire Bill of Rights without limitation.452 The 
Bill of Rights holds no higher authority than any other legislation,453 and Section 4 forbids the 
judiciary from overturning another statute that conflicts or contravenes the Bill of Rights.454 
Instead, the court enforces its regular remedial responses to resolve the case and issues a 
declaration of inconsistency because the statute’s conflict is unreasonable or no interpretation 
avoids the conflict.455 The declaration vindicates the protected right breached by the other 
Parliamentary act.456 The adaptable Bill of Rights reflects New Zealand’s legal culture, which 




recognizes the Constitution as partially unwritten and continuously evolving.457 On the surface, it 
appears that modern federal legislatures worldwide are reluctant to adopt property rights regardless 
of their nations’ histories.458 Verily, the U.S. Congress has been in gridlock enacting federal 
property rights legislation on three occasions,459 and the Federal Acquisition Policies are non-
binding recommendations.460  
Since all land is Crown land or Māori land until the Crown alienates fee simple estates, a 
private landowner cannot assert even a natural right in the land, indirectly questioning Parliament’s 
public interest justification or the Māori Land Court’s rejection of a change of ownership.461 In the 
U.S., the government is supposed to protect the American people’s inherent, natural right to 
property.462 The legislature and Crown neither gifted nor derived the right to property; the 
American people and jurisprudence hold this right as existing before the U.S. Constitution’s 
ratification.463 The discrepancy between the U.S. and New Zealand in their interpretation of 
property rights makes the property rights rankings debatable.  
Bill of Rights. Section 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 bars unreasonable 
searches and seizures, but the courts observe this protection as an amalgamation of rights, not an 
exclusive property protection against searches and seizures.464 A safeguard against property 
seizures is a criminal defense; however, it expressly omits compensation concerning land seizures, 
whether for prosecutions or expropriations.465 The modern trend in New Zealand has been to 
expand the scope of the Bill of Rights generously; nevertheless, the court declined claims to read 
a right to property or compensation into the Bill of Rights.466 Parliament’s full and exclusive power 
to legislate makes Parliament immune from enacting “unconstitutional” laws.467  
Inconsistent with the United States, New Zealand provides less authoritative protections to 
property and economic interests,468 and the Bill of Rights never conferred absolute rights since it 




restricts those enumerated rights to a reasonableness test.469 For example, a government agent 
entering a property with prior notice470 to inspect or conduct a proposed public work is not afforded 
stricter judicial scrutiny because complying with the prior notice requirement is considered 
reasonable,471 although the government’s power to inspect the property has no immediate statutory 
defense against loss, damage, or injury on the property.472 Property may be taken by statute if 
Parliament considers the nonrecognition of the property necessary in the public interests.473 Even 
the common law presumption against expropriation or the presumption against restrictions of 
property rights without consent or compensation does not prevail over Parliament’s statutes.474  
New Zealand once recognized the British landowner’s power of veto and injunction 
remedy – to forbid certain actions on the property regardless of the amount of damage to the 
property.475 In the Goodson case, the British Court of Appeals in Chancery proposed that 
Parliament should answer whether the public interest of installing water pipes outweighed the 
private interests.476 However, the New Zealand Parliament has answered all possible questions 
about what qualifies as a public interest. The power-of-veto claim is powerless after New Zealand 
enacted multiple specific or overbroad public purposes throughout many Acts.477 Consequently, 
the Courts cannot consider or revive a power of veto when Parliament has answered the question 
by making most acquisitions a statutory public purpose, whether by private companies or Crown 
agencies.478 Generally, the Ministers of Land’s power to acquire land does not apply to acquisitions 
solely benefiting private interests with no present or foreseeable public need or benefit.479 
The courts also do not uplift the Bill of Rights Act to a quasi-constitutional authority, above 
Parliament’s legislative power, when expanding its scope via the common law.480 The strength of 
parliamentary supremacy has made New Zealand courts reluctant to declare statutes inconsistent 
since the ruling leaves the impermissible statute effective until Parliament decides to cure the 




inconsistency.481 The Attorney-General once appealed the court’s ruling that the statute is 
conflicting, instead of reporting the inconsistency to Parliament.482 The court’s aversion to creating 
a common-law quasi-constitutional property right leaves the case law vacuous, unilaterally 
impacting economic and societal matters.483 As a counterargument to the expansionist trend, 
Parliament drafted the Bill of Rights with precise words to inhibit purposivist interpretations.484 
Without an enumerated statement on “property,” the Courts have no text to expand. The lack of 
property rights in New Zealand resonates with its British heritage. As Tom Allen, Professor of 
International Law, has written, “the British campaign for rights to property met with very little 
resistance from national leaders, and the impact of a right to property on a state's power to reform 
the economic system was often left unexamined.”485  This propensity does not mean New 
Zealand’s ancestry held no property rights. British common law espoused a “presumption, in the 
interpretation of statutes, against an intention to interfere with vested property rights.”486  
One critic suggests that judicial discretion for determining property rights would make the 
legislature disinterested in drafting statutory rules regarding property rights.487 However, New 
Zealand has frequently enacted and amended laws relating to expropriations and land-use. 
Parliament recently created an independent hearing panel for urban development, arbitrating the 
housing authority’s development plans with the public concerns and the law.488 Parliament 
established the New Zealand Land Valuation Tribunal and its relationship to the High Court.489 
Antithetical to the critic’s suggestion, nominal judicial property rights have not dissuaded the New 
Zealand Parliament from ratifying a detailed public works regime with many levels of judicial 
oversight and compensation rules. 
Magna Carta. New Zealand has a separate constitutional safeguard that indirectly 
prevents injustices in property matters. Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta states, “No freeman shall 




be . . . disseised of his freehold or liberties, or free customs . . . but . . . by the law of the land.”490 
The Magna Carta remains binding legislation under New Zealand’s Imperial Laws Application Act 
1988 and its First Schedule.491 However, the Magna Carta protections have merely validated the 
Public Works Act’s existence as the statutes conferring the power to expropriate.492 The Magna 
Carta has no separate property protection and has predominately been applied to criminal due 
process cases.493 Thus, landowners cannot plead the Magna Carta as a direct defense against 
expropriation.494 Instead, the legislature must promulgate the procedures to expropriate,495 and 
Parliament, at its discretion, grants citizens a claim to compensation for land taken under a 
legislatively prescribed public purpose.496 Courts have interpreted those prescribed statutes to 
ensure fair compensation,497 which probably generated the widespread accolades on property 
rights.498 The common law mandates a hearing when a government decision will affect property 
rights or a person’s livelihood, which facilitates natural justice.499  
The Magna Carta does not limit Parliament’s legislative power because any property or 
compensation rights depend on Parliament’s grace through enactments.500 The Magna Carta is not 
New Zealand’s first Public Works Act; it lacks any compensation parameters: such as “just 
compensation” or “full compensation” in other constitutions.501 The courts and municipalities 
comply with the Magna Carta by following the rules under Parliament’s Public Works Act because 
the Magna Carta only asks the government to comply with its statutes on expropriations.502 
New Zealand’s interpretation of the Magna Carta is not conclusive worldwide. When South 
Carolina lacked a right to compensation in its constitution,503 Justice Richardson of the South 
Carolina Court of Appeals recognized the Magna Carta as having a sacred right to 
compensation.504   




The lack of property rights in New Zealand. New Zealand may have precarious property 
rights similar to the majority worldwide trend, notwithstanding its accolades.505 Parliament can 
abolish any property interest without justification, but at this time, the New Zealand Parliament is 
trustworthy enough to not radically overturn long-standing precedence. Justice McGechan 
summarizes the flimsiness of New Zealand property protections and the tyranny-of-the-majority 
threat: 
[P]rovided Parliament proceeds according to mandatory law governing the 
procedure for enacting legislation (“manner and form”), Parliament is sovereign 
and can pass any legislation it sees fit. In particular, Parliament can enact laws 
expropriating property without compensation. In doing so, it can step right through 
existing laws and rights, obliterating remedies which otherwise would exist. The 
Courts, providing Parliament proceeds according to law in the way described, 
cannot stop Parliament making such legislative changes. It cannot strike down such 
legislative changes once made (subject to the possible extreme reservation 
mentioned). There is no supreme law in New Zealand which inhibits those powers. 
In particular, Parliament can pass laws which are directly contrary to provisions of 
the [Bill of Rights]. . . . It is not for the unelected Courts to frustrate that legislative 
ability. If content of legislation offends, the remedies are political and ultimately 
electoral. The fact those alternatives seem monumentally difficult, indeed unreal, 
to particular persons, or to those espousing unpopular causes, is no more than a 
dark side of democracy.506 
 
Justice Cooke reassured New Zealanders that “there are some principles of [New 
Zealand’s] unwritten constitution that even Parliament could not override.”507 Unfortunately, this 
opinion merely created academic controversy than a common-law defense, deniable by 
parliamentary supremacy or statutes.508 Parliament has the flexible power to make and repeal any 
laws at any time, and New Zealand’s judiciary cannot invalidate legislation or conflicting 
statutes.509 New Zealand has made expropriation without compensation510 and abolishing certain 
property interests511 unworthy of an unwritten protection in its common law, even when the 
community values the property being expropriated or abolished.512 These findings befit New 
Zealand’s constitutional culture of egalitarianism and absolutistic parliamentary supremacy, as 




described by the Honorable Matthew Palmer and senior lecturer, Fiona Baker at Victoria 
University of Wellington.513  
The Courts cannot impose an obligation on Parliament to legislate, but the Court’s long-
standing common law rules could inscribe a customary fundamental property right separate from 
Parliamentary acts.514 The common law affords greater security from Parliament’s politicization 
of fundamental rights.515 Parliament can void these common law and customary rights by one 
statute abolishing the property interest.516 However, a common-law norm proactively institutes 
constitutional propriety over good expropriation practices, creating cultural expectations 
independent from the evolving Bill of Rights.517 At a minimum, other property rights can survive 
drastic legislative or common law changes when the practitioner can argue similarities between 
the common law principles and the custom or unwritten respect of property rights.518 A custom 
inconsistent with the common law will not prevail.519 The courts have “inherent jurisdiction to 
guard and promote the due administration of justice according to law[,]”520 and at times, the 
judiciary should exercise this jurisdiction against the absolute deference to Parliament.  
Analogous to Singapore, the New Zealand Government had a historically anti-landowner 
bias in remedying the harms of expropriations: “in no other kind of contract with the law does the 
average citizen feel the cards are stacked against him so much as when his land is required by 
either the Crown or a local authority.”521 Until the current Public Works Act’s assent in 1981, 
commentators contended the expropriation framework failed in clarity, openness, fairness, and 
political responsibility.522 Matters of national importance served as a catch-all term to free the state 
of notice requirements and community discourse.523 Even today, some New Zealanders find 
“something foreign about the ‘property rights ethos[.]’”524 Arguments averring coastal land as 
having a social character in New Zealand – “community and egalitarianism” – cancelled private 




coastal land developments.525 Since New Zealand property rights depend on the voting public’s 
mass approval,526 property rights’ sustainability remains suspect. With approximately 45% of New 
Zealand’s surface area owned by private individuals, many landowners may appreciate more 
protective action to preserve their Crown-alienated land from resumption.527  
Nationalization. The Land Transfer Act of 1952 established secure and guaranteed title 
transfers after the Crown conveyed the property to private individuals.528 The exception being how 
New Zealand nationalized natural resources and took those resources without paying 
compensation.529 The landowner can recover injurious affection to her other property, legal and 
valuation fees, loss of income, loss of privacy, and costs related to monitoring the miner’s 
compliance with any access arrangement between the proprietor and the miner.530 Landowners 
intending to use the Crown-reserved resources on their land for their personal benefit must seek 
the Crown’s approval with a permit.531 The same approval process applies to landowners 
protecting their land from coastline erosion.532 When the Crown does not protect the coastline, the 
landowner cannot act with self-help, and the Crown has no duty to pay compensation for the 
erosion damage to coastline homes.533 New Zealand effectively revoked the gifted right to property 
and restored the “longstanding status quo[,]”534 similar to how abolishing a property interest is 
acceptable if enshrined in a statute and politically profitable.535 Large companies prefer 
nationalization because negotiating with a government entity is easier than negotiating with 
countless landowners parcel-by-parcel.536  
New Zealand is not prone to impending expropriation risk with the absent legal 
safeguards.537 When the Crown granted fee simple land to landowners, the Crown drafted 
covenants within the conveyance, subjecting the lands to specified Crown projects.538 Parliament 
may draft legislation bypassing the Public Works Act’s landowner entitlement and allowing the 




Crown to undertake public works under a different Act without compensation.539 A question 
remains whether the landowner received a discount on the land or some other advantage for 
entering the inferior land transfer.540 Evading the Public Works Act would be politically 
unprofitable today. The same disapproval is found when a municipality honestly exercises 
authority under a different statute that did not grant a confiscatory power; the municipality is liable 
in tort for the ultra vires act.541 
Compensation. The basic entitlement is full compensation for the expropriation or 
injurious affection.542 Full compensation emphasizes the claimant’s right to a complete equivalent 
position of what the government confiscated.543 As Justice French adjudged, with full 
compensation, “[t]he claimant has the right to be put, so far as money can do it, in the same position 
as if their land had not been taken.”544 Compensation is assessed as the fair market value of the 
parcel or the expropriated portion of the land.545 Inflation and the government’s delay in paying 
compensation confers a right to simple interest at an interest rate that cures inflation and bears 
interest.546 The landowner cannot collect interest on the compensation award when the 
landowner’s objection caused the delayed payment.547 New Zealand strives to achieve a principle 
of equivalence: “any compensation should place the owner in a position as near as possible to that 
which was enjoyed prior to the undertaking of the works in question.”548  
The landowner must apply to the Land Valuation Tribunal (hereinafter the “Tribunal”) to 
determine compensation for compulsory acquisition unless the government and landowner execute 
an agreement settling the compensation amount.549 Compensation is computed using the 
property’s market value as if a willing buyer purchased the property and a willing seller sold the 
property on a date when the government vested its interest in the property.550 The market value 
should account for both a premium to have multiple land-uses and lost profits from the abrogated 




land uses, which is compensable as injurious affection.551 Doubts in valuation must be construed 
in favor of the landowner.552 The Courts dismiss sentimental value or improvements generating no 
return-on-asset.553 The court might reclassify the time and money spent on the improvements as 
sentimental value regardless if the sentimental improvement increased the property value.554  
Injurious Affection. Injurious affection is the depreciated land value of the landowner’s 
retained remainder interest caused by a government action.555 This is best shown with partial 
takings where the landowner’s remainder loses value or is damaged from the adjacent public work. 
A loss of a potential land-use is injurious affection; meanwhile, the loss or replacement costs of 
the government’s written consent to conduct activities on the land constitute a disturbance 
payment.556 The government may claim a set-off against injurious affection if the government’s 
public work concurrently increases the value of the remainder interest.557 
Solatium Payment. Negotiation efforts are strongly encouraged given the government’s 
obligation to “make every endeavor to negotiate in good faith with the owner” under the Public 
Works Act.558 In 2017, Parliament further enticed landowners to settle with a $35,000 to $50,000 
bonus to compensation if the landowners’ primary residence is expropriated.559 A compensation 
bonus of 10% of the land’s value – not exceeding $25,000 – applies in circumstances where the 
land is not a primary residence.560 For dwelling compensation awards that exceed the $35,000 base 
amount, $10,000 is an early signing bonus to encourage agreements about the compensation award 
that eludes litigation,561 and the remaining $5,000 is a discretionary award determined by the 
applicable agency.562 Entering an agreement with all the signing bonuses amounts to $50,000. The 
discretionary award has no published guidance;563 thus, the landowner would need to plead their 
hardship during settlement negotiations to receive the bonus of $5,000. 




Other forms of compensation. New Zealand compensates the landowner’s moving 
costs,564 expenditures for finding substitute land,565 the diminution in value of the company’s 
goodwill,566 and replacement fixtures for the disabled landowners to access their new home.567 
Ancillary expenses to complete the expropriation, such as negotiation costs or fact-finding, are 
compensable as disturbance payments.568 However, the Tribunal has rejected the sole-shareholder 
of a corporation from lifting the corporate veil and requesting disturbance compensation to the 
sole-shareholder.569 An acquisition notice that prejudiced the property’s sale, prejudiced 
investment opportunities paid with the land sale proceeds, delayed private redevelopment, and 
stopped searches for new tenants was not compensable or a disturbance.570 The claimants may 
yield an award for the work stoppage and lost profits when the court record proves the 
government’s failure to comply with its obligations caused the work stoppage.571  
Buyback Procedure. When the government ceases to require the expropriated property 
for the specified public work or any subsequent public work, the appropriate authority must sell 
the land to the original landowner or her immediate descendants at the current market value or less 
if the authority considers it reasonable.572 The successors may purchase the expropriated land even 
when the landowners relinquished its ownership due to situations independent of the Public Works 
Act: e.g., the government threatened a compulsory purchase if the original landowner did not 
execute the agreement to expropriate.573   
Buyback Problems. The death of the landowner and the landowner’s immediate 
descendants eliminates the buyback for all subsequent generations of that family, even if the 
government erroneously offered a buyback to a subsequent generation.574 The family’s short length 
of ownership before the expropriation may weaken the justification to execute the buyback 
procedure.575 To make matters more convoluted, a family that incorporates their farm may lose 




their right to a buyback because a corporation converts the familial interest in land into an 
economic interest.576 The buyback opportunity is beneficial, but the displaced former landowner 
may not be able to repurchase the property at the current market value presuming land appreciates 
over time and the government installed commercial improvements or public work structures. 
Landowners may only repurchase their land during a declining housing market at more affordable 
prices. If land prices rise, the government could prejudice the former owner by delaying the 
buyback, making the market value impossible for repurchasing and ensuring the current titleholder 
– the government agency – receives a large capital gain.577 The government receives reasonable 
time to offer the buyback.578 Thus, delaying the buyback procedure for years is rarely a litigation 
claim, yet the government circumvents the buyback by delaying investigation of whether the 
public work is abandoned.579 Nonetheless, the courts are reluctant to sever land that is not being 
used for the stated public purpose, over three decades after the expropriation, because the land has 
the potential to be used for the public purpose at some indefinite future time.580 Moreover, the 
adjacent property owner may have a prioritized right-of-first-refusal against the buyback when the 
abutting landowner – who may not be the condemnee – could reasonably use the converted, 
expropriated land.581 
Resource Consents (Zoning). New Zealand does not protect landowners suffering from a 
regulatory taking unless specific legislation authorizes compensation.582 New Zealand refunds 
contributions paid towards suspended developments or land-uses when the local government 
cancels a permit583 or waits for it to lapse to discontinue the private activity.584 Landowners hold 
no defendable interest in their land-use.585 The local authority has no duty of care to landowners 
when a permit is revoked unless the authority failed to comply with the statutory procedure for 
issuing the permit.586 The landowner may negotiate work, services, or ways to mitigate the adverse 




environmental effects that the private activity could cause to the landscape.587 These negotiations 
equate to landowners “buying” themselves a resource consent588 since the extra environmental 
protections generate “a net (social) benefit in any exercise of a resource consent.”589 Even if the 
landowner successfully acquires the resource consent, a trade competitor may object to the 
resource consent if they tailor the objection to aver anything except the threat of trade 
competition.590 The consenting authority or courts should not factor the resource consent’s effect 
on competition.591 The landowner’s only solution is to appeal the regulation or zoning plan to the 
Environment Court,592 which generally does not award court costs on planning appeals.593 The 
landowner would seek to modify, delete, or replace the existing or proposed zoning plan.594 The 
landowner would plead either (1) the plan frustrates the reasonable use of the land, or (2) the plan 
imposes an unfair or unreasonable burden on any property interest holder: e.g., mineral rights 
affected, but not the surface rights.595  
New Zealand does not compensate regulatory takings, which allows limitless restrictions 
on the property without compensation if property title remains with the landowner.596 However, 
landowners can appeal the land-use restriction based on the legislation’s scope permitting the 
encumbrance and whether a pretext or ulterior plan produced the restriction.597 The government 
may escape the Public Work compensation requirement by imposing conditions on resource 
consents that induce an expropriation-like effect. In Estate Homes Ltd, a subdivision developer 
was required to construct an arterial road on the government’s behalf, using the developer’s 
property as a precondition for earning the permit to construct the subdivision.598 The Supreme 
Court denied the developer’s compensation claim because the developer did not need to build a 
subdivision, ignoring the landowner’s intended purposes for investing in the land.599 The 
government’s delegation of public works to the zoning permitholder must have a logical 




connection with the proposed development, although the public work is unnecessary for the 
permitholder: i.e., the subdivision did not need an arterial road.600 This benchmark invites many 
public works to attach to private developments for the government’s convenience.  
New Zealand’s zoning structure is unsympathetic compared to its former parent: The 
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom compensates land interests affected by the revocation, 
modification,601 or discontinuance of the land-use permission and the imposition of conditions to 
retain the current land-use.602 Suppose a development order is revoked and the landowner’s 
development permission is revoked a second time or subject to more conditions; in that case, the 
landowner-developer may claim compensation if the U.K. Parliament did not exempt the right to 
compensation in a separate regulation.603 The High Court said it best, “the statutory regime which 
governs planning law in the United Kingdom is very different from that which applies in this 
country.”604 For landowners, New Zealand’s divergence from U.K. planning law leaves fewer 
legal defenses.605 New Zealand could take legislative action to compete with the U.K.’s planning 
law while continuing its historical disclamation of regulatory takings,606 analogous to how New 
Zealand’s grander anti-property-rights sentiment has not disturbed its equitable expropriation 
laws. Case in point, U.K. restorative rights for modified or revoked permits has not instituted 
regulatory takings action; instead, the U.K. awards a damages remedy when landowners rely on 
the government’s resource consent, regardless if the government errored in issuing the original 
resource consent or changed its policy.607  
Conclusion. New Zealand is the baseline expropriation regime since most countries do not 
intend to raise property to a fundamental or absolutist right. New Zealand pays full compensation 
with bonuses to encourage settlements and to acknowledge the displaced landowner’s hardship. In 
2020, New Zealand reached more settlement agreements to expropriate than conventional Notices 




of Intention to Take Land.608 New Zealand’s regime can accommodate countries aspiring to 
improve their economies without recognizing economic freedoms in the law. New Zealand has no 
intention of limiting Parliament’s power, allowing the judiciary to invalidate conflicting statutes, 
or creating common law property rights beyond those already expressed in Parliament’s 
legislation. New Zealand is less accepting of common law property protections than the U.K.609 
Expropriation issues are relative to the country’s smaller size since the number of takings notices 
and cases matches the quantity found in the few U.S. states that prominently exercise eminent 
domain. Most expropriations arise in the major cities, which skews how widespread expropriations 
are for rural landowners.610 Although these characteristics resemble an authoritarian country, New 
Zealand has little corruption and a strong judicial system.611 In many respects, the New Zealand 
system has proven that an unfree, undemocratic country could retain its autocratic authority 
without sacrificing baseline property protections: non-discriminatory expropriations with 
indemnifying compensation for the victims. 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 – SWITZERLAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS & 
FUNDAMENTAL EMINENT DOMAIN PRINCIPLES 
This chapter will discuss Swiss laws relating to expropriation and regulatory takings. The 
federal constitution, expropriation act, and spatial planning act have fulsome remedies for 
landowners subject to expropriation-like government activities. The Switzerland advantage 
defends property from many perspectives: its institutional nature, the proportionality of the harms, 
its susceptibility to excessive regulations, and contribution to the economy and food supply. 
Switzerland is the most unique country included in this study. It is the only Studied Nation 
with a civil law system;612 hence, the Swiss Courts cannot declare Acts of the Federal Assembly 




(legislative branch) or Federal Council (federal branch) as unconstitutional.613 These traits are 
noteworthy since common law countries tend to have greater property and contract rights than civil 
code countries.614 Without a common law system, all judicial decisions are non-binding on other 
courts unless that court’s specific case ruling was overruled by the same court or a higher court.615 
Civil law countries favor parliamentary supremacy and skeptical of the judiciary correcting the 
legislature.616 Nonetheless, the Federal Supreme Court (“Bundesgericht”) contributed to the 
interpretation of the constitution, yet their opinions cannot serve as a formal constitutional law 
source.617  
Switzerland’s federal constitution embodies an economic constitutional law that finds a 
free, independent livelihood and economic system as fundamental to the nation.618 Switzerland has 
the most meticulous constitutional defenses of the Studied Nations: (1) a right to property,619 (2) a 
right to economic freedom,620 (3) a principle of economic order forcing the federal and canton 
governments to respect and safeguard economic freedom,621 and (4) other inferential constitutional 
rights protecting property.   
Switzerland’s subnational governments are known as cantons. The Swiss cantonal 
constitutions infrequently provide an additional cause of action supplementing the federal 
constitutional claims: i.e., practitioners only plead the federal constitution given its legal 
supremacy over cantonal law.622 However, similar to the state constitutions within the United 
States, the cantons can furnish more rights than the Swiss federal constitution unless federal law 
has spoken.623 The cantons nurtured the cultural admiration of property and economic freedom, 
while the federal government codified these principles.624 The federal jurisprudence established 
an unwritten fundamental property right due to the cantons’ constitutional guarantee.625 Once the 
federal government acquired spatial planning (“zoning”) powers under the 1960 Constitutional 




revision, the federal government enacted a constitutional property right to ensure the cantonal, 
traditional guarantee of property withstands the new federal and cantonal zoning powers.626 Zoning 
can have an expropriation-effect, known as material expropriation in Switzerland, which explains 
the future discussions about zoning relations to expropriation. 
Right to Property. The Swiss constitutional right to property (1) protects the economic 
rights of the owner against restrictive State measures; (2) guarantees property as a fundamental 
institution, ensuring the protection of accumulated assets; (3) protects the owner from the harms 
of other landowners; and (4) guarantees compensation from compulsory takings.627 The protection 
is not absolute; the municipality can zone property to prohibit certain activities or constrain the 
land use to a specified public interest.628 Although the Constitution commits to a market economy, 
these higher protections do not deflate the Swiss welfare state.629 Switzerland recognized property 
as a natural law because cantons guaranteed private property in their constitutions before the 
confederation and federal constitution arose.630  
In other respects, Switzerland’s intention to defend against the tyranny-of-the-majority 
failed.631 The Supreme Court’s rhetoric suggests that private property, as a fundamental right, is 
above the public interests except for the public interests given constitutional authority through a 
referendum.632 Landowners rarely prevail in disputing the public interest, given the legislature’s 
vast discretion in construing a public interest.633 Commentators have proposed restricting the 
public interest to the constitutionally recognized public policies; this would eliminate spatial 
planning decrees that aim to intervene in economic competition and property.634   
The Swiss institutional guarantee makes private property an object above regulations635 
that is immune from a new administration restructuring the country into a centrally-planned 
system.636 Regulations cannot undermine property, impair someone’s personhood, or be devoid of 




saving, investing, or creating new assets.637 The institutional guarantee demands the legislature to 
promote property’s appreciation, creativity, and productivity by its private owners.638  
The institutional guarantee preserves the legislature’s sweeping discretion to regulate 
property developments,639 subject to the landowner’s right to demand compensation for regulatory 
takings and choose to sell the regulated property to a non-government entity.640  Although the 
institutional guarantee has never reversed a cantonal property regulation, the U.S. may see 
different results with this unique defense since Switzerland found that the institutional guarantee 
is an indispensable prerequisite to preserving a predominately free-market economy.641  
In Switzerland, an expropriation occurs when the State withdraws a person’s property 
rights and transfers the property rights to an expropriator for a public interest, which may be a 
public or private work.642 A material expropriation exists when the landowner is prohibited or 
seriously restricted from using the property.643 The extent of the restriction remains unformulaic, 
but property losing more than 20% of its value constitutes a material expropriation.644 Federal 
judges hold an unwritten power to define what qualifies as a serious restriction for each case.645 If 
property development could show the future use likely would have existed except for the 
government’s prohibition, then the Courts must consider the deprived future use of the property 
that is no longer possible.646 If the regulation substantially affects one or a few person’s property 
interests, then compensation is necessary for their unequal sacrifice for the community’s benefit.647 
Secondarily, the court can deem a regulation to be an expropriation without a transfer of ownership 
and when the landowner’s circumstances failed to persuade the court that a material expropriation 
occurred.648 Article 5 of the Swiss Constitution demands government action to serve the public 
interest and to balance and consider all interests to achieve that public initiative.649 The court deems 
an expropriation in circumstances where the landowner deserves compensation to preserve legal 




equality, such as indemnifying a landowner who suffered an unreasonable harm.650 In theory, 
compensation for regulatory takings is compensation for the government’s breach of trust.651 If the 
regulation is unlawful, then similar to the Studied Nations, the landowner is seeking damages for 
the illegal regulation or pseudo-taking.652  
The property guarantee frustrates (1) the repeal of private property, (2) excessive property 
transfers to the State, (3) the severe impairment of using property or its essence as a legal concept, 
and (4) other individuals from encroaching on the property.653 A landowner’s property is her legal 
sphere, deserving of no state interference.654 The Swiss legislature cannot abolish private property 
since property is held as “a fundamental element of the social and legal order[,]” according to 
prominent professor Enrico Riva.655  As a Swiss institution, government systems must arrange 
themselves around property having legal force throughout society.656 Cantons and the Swiss Code 
determine what is property, but, at a minimum, all property must be ownable, operable, and 
disposable by private individuals.657 
Although the Right to Property raises procedural guarantees, the generic constitutional 
right to a judicial assessment of a legal dispute suffices, except the right to access a court is not 
always available if federal or cantonal law prohibits the hearing of certain subject-matter.658 The 
Government must comply with Article 36 to not infringe on constitutional guarantees. The Article 
36 infringement must (1) have a legal basis that satisfies legal equality, (2) be justified by a public 
interest, (3) protect other citizen’s fundamental rights, or (4) be proportional to the harms caused 
by the expropriation to achieve that public interest.659 Lastly, the core legal content or essence of 
the guarantee cannot be subordinate to the public interest because some regulations overstep the 
bounds of constitutional rights.660   




Legal Basis & Public Interests. Constitutional public interest provisions include the 
protection of water resources, forests, and cultural heritage; these assets are bestowed equivalent 
authoritative power as the property guarantee.661 Thus, landowners may not receive compensation 
when their property is encumbered as a precaution for those constitutional public interests unless 
the cumulative encumbrances practically expropriate the land.662 Although untested at trial, a 
homeowner could argue the expropriation of her home intrudes on the constitutional public interest 
to encourage homeownership.663 The Supreme Court examines the public interest and the source 
of that claimed interest for arbitrariness when the right to property has been encroached.664 Similar 
to the traditional United States rules, a Swiss public interest favoring a private party must not be a 
pretext to transfer wealth to a different private individual.665 State tax revenues are never 
considered a public interest justification.666 A serious encroachment, such as difficulty putting the 
land into use, requires a clear and unambiguous legal basis from a statute.667 For illustration, one 
farmer did not consent to hang-gliders flying over her property and was disallowed from building 
any structures on her property.668 The Court found that the government could constitutionally 
restrict the farmer’s construction to protect hang-gliders flying over the property, reasoning that 
the farmer’s disrupted possession mandated compensation whenever a hang-glider landed on her 
farm.669 An activity’s popularity is a public interest consideration that could prohibit building 
permits.670  In this case, someone potentially entering one’s property for amusement purposes was 
an adequate public interest.671  
Some public interests outweigh a public work. For example, any expropriation must protect 
historical sites and cultural monuments registered in the Federal Inventory that hold equal or 
greater national importance than the public work.672 Nationally important interests are read 
harmoniously. Thus, one important interest may harm another important interest only if the 




greatest possible protection to the harmed interest is observed; otherwise, the government must 
abandon the proposed public work.673 Abandonment is the only option because if the public work 
could have been moved, the “greatest possible protection” standard would have mandated the 
public work’s relocation to preserve both national interests.674 The government has broad 
discretion to decide whether a property is worthy of national importance or expropriation,675 
discrediting the balancing act of conflicting public interests. 
When the public interest justification for an expropriation disappears or the land-use plan 
is revised, the landowners can request a legal review of whether their properties should remain 
taken and how the plan should be revised.676 The landowner may claim a lack of good faith 
government action under the constitution if the government violates the review requirements or 
abuses its discretion in reassessing the public-versus-private interests.677  
For federal expropriations, private-to-private takings are permissible and normative if the 
third-party will serve the interests of the entire country or serves the public interests under federal 
law.678 The Swiss have considered property as having a societal obligation to excuse 
encroachments that serve spatial planning or non-confiscatory tax objectives.679 The government 
successfully confiscated a ski lift on a farmer’s property for a future ski resort because the farmer 
refused to continue operating the ski lift.680 In another case, the tenant successfully used the 
municipal council to expropriate their landlord’s property to maintain a subleased golf course when 
the landlord refused to continue the lease.681 Tourism is a strong public interest in Switzerland.682 
The transfer of the expropriation power to third-parties is not given stricter burdens of proof,683 
and other federal laws authorize private corporations – e.g., pipeline companies – to expropriate if 
there’s a jurisdictional statute authorizing the private activity.684 Four cantons expressly prohibit 




private-to-private transfers by denying grants of cantonal expropriation powers to private persons; 
the cantons are Uri, Zug, Schaffhausen, and Aargau.685  
Proportionality. Under the proportionality principle, (1) the encumbrance or 
expropriation must be necessary to achieve the public interest,686 (2) the public interest must be 
sufficiently important to prevail over the landowner’s interests,687 (3) the government must not 
encumber the property more than necessary to achieve the public interest benefits, and (4) the 
limitation on property ownership must be reasonable.688 The Expropriation Act provides a 
measurable, fact-dependent exception. The expropriator may acquire the entire parcel, instead of 
the part necessary for the public interest, when the value of the remainder depreciates more than 
one-third of its market value and the remainder is disproportionately difficult to use after erecting 
the public work.689 The derogation of market value results from the landowner’s inability to use 
land profitably.690 Before expropriating private land, the municipality must use its available public 
land.691 Otherwise, constitutional proportionality would be violated since the municipality 
procured additional land for no objective reason: i.e., they needed more land for the project.692 
Proportionality may not defend landowners when there are no other options. Even when 
landowners raised proportionality complaints, a court found that the lack of any other route to 
install a pipeline eliminated discussions about private interests.693   
A public interest must present a stronger rationale when the private interests would suffer 
a substantial harm as a result of expropriation.694 One canton violated equal protection and the 
proportionality principle when it allowed municipalities the right to purchase residential property 
for a compelling public interest when landowners requested a permit to demolish, modify, or 
change the land-use of a residential property.695 Therefore, the civil code preempting the possibility 
of less intrusive means to accomplish a public interest would violate the proportionality 




principle.696 In a contrary example, the government attempted to expropriate agricultural land – a 
statutorily protected public interest that is less authoritative than the constitutional public interest 
of spatial planning.697 The government would install a communal shooting range in compliance 
with federal law.698 Two public interests – agricultural land and landscape protection –  and the 
farmer’s private interest conflicted with the public interest of constructing community shooting 
ranges.699 The Supreme Court repealed the municipality’s expropriation because it failed to 
consider these other statutory and private interests and failed to research other lands that could be 
converted into a shooting range.700  
The landowner may receive compensation if the government gave the landowner binding 
assurances on how the landowner could use the land, and the government later reneged on those 
assurances by changing the land’s zoning.701 Nevertheless, modifications to the building code or 
zoning plan do not violate the good faith dealings requirement as landowners have no vested 
interest in land-use determinations.702 Contrarily, zoning schemes outmaneuvering compensation 
requirements would contravene public policy.703 A municipality cannot amend the property’s 
zoning designation based solely on administrative efficiency.704  
Federal & Cantonal Compensation Prerequisites. The federal constitution and some 
cantonal constitutions guarantee a right to full compensation with the objective of indemnifying 
the condemnee.705 The government agency’s jurisdiction and the legislation qualifying the 
expropriation can restrict the compensation’s scope.706 For example, a federal agency must comply 
with the federal procedures under the Spatial Planning Act.707 If a cantonal government actor 
applies the federal procedures to the expropriation, instead of cantonal formal expropriation 
procedures, then the canton government cannot offer compensation beyond the federal standard, 
although their cantonal legislation and constitution express the contrary.708 The compensation 




award can exceed the federal standard only if (1) the canton conducted a formal, nonmaterial 
expropriation under its cantonal expropriation procedures, and (2) the surplus compensation is paid 
to all condemnees equally based on the injustice suffered.709 All material expropriations must 
comply with federal procedures, meaning the landowner can recover full compensation without 
special surcharges.710 This compensation discount may encourage cantons to deliberately design 
projects as material expropriations to abate the bonus compensation.711   
Economic Freedom Principles. The Swiss Constitution has a Right to Economic Freedom 
and a Principles of The Economic System.712 Economic Freedom is the unconstrained pursuit of 
private economic activity to make a living.713 The Constitution also guarantees Switzerland as a 
market economy714 under certain exceptions. The exceptions entail cantons monopolizing an 
industry or setting price-controls within their jurisdiction715 and allowing private monopolies to 
efficiently and inexpensively appease the general population’s needs or health.716 The Federal 
Assembly retains the sole authority to enact restrictions of constitutional rights.717 The public’s 
benefit from these exceptions must (1) overpower the adversely-impacted private interests,718 (2) 
outweigh the constitution’s preference for competition, and (3) have a legal rationale before 
ratification, such as protecting public order.719 Shielding an industry from competition curtails the 
constitution’s free-trade principle, making the regulation – the shield – unconstitutional.720 A 
canton cannot force a business to purchase certain inputs or services for the community’s benefit 
without violating constitutional economic freedom.721 Economic freedom liberated the trade 
barriers between the cantons,722 which explains why only the federal government can enact laws 
that derogate economic freedoms.723 Unfortunately, Economic Freedom is considered a lesser 
fundamental right than other Swiss liberties.  




Constitutional Economic Freedom (1) protects persons from restrictive state measures to 
produce and trade, (2) ensures the government keeps the business environment favorable to the 
private sector, and (3) prevents conflicting cantonal markets in Switzerland.724  The economic 
principle, in part, forces the federal and cantonal governments to preserve economic freedom.725 
Nationalizing an industry will not allow the government to bypass economic freedom requirements 
or sue a private-sector competitor under an economic freedom violation.726  
Economic Freedom’s relation to Property Rights. The combination of a right to property 
and economic freedom fosters an ancillary constitutional freedom to contract, which is necessary 
for economic activity.727 Albeit rare, the freedom to contract stops governments from controlling 
alienation or forcing the property into a specified use.728 For instance, freezing the price of land 
and forcing a lease of vacant housing units were violations that impaired the landowner’s 
disposition of her property and freedom to contract.729  
The government can infringe on economic freedom on similar grounds as the right to 
property: protecting the environment and heritage, assuming the property is maintainable.730 
Traditionally, courts scrutinized public interests; however, many commercial police powers and 
socio-political reasons excuse economic freedom encumbrances, except for state-controlled 
economic activity.731 Constitutional liberties outweigh any ensuing job losses and reduced 
business productivity from the state-controlled activity requiring trade protectionism.732 
Nevertheless, a pretext to create an economic policy through zoning regulations would violate 
economic freedom and be overturned.733  
To limit the Constitutional protections, Article 36 of the Swiss Constitution provides a 
four-part test to restrict a fundamental right. The Test limits restrictions on the rights of property 




and economic freedom.734 To comply with Article 36, the economic freedom or right to property 
restriction:  
(1) must have been put into law by a municipality or legislature735 to serve a public interest 
or protect a third-party’s constitutional rights;736  
(2) must be suitable, reasonable, and necessary to achieve the expressed public interest;737  
(3) must not abrogate the core or essence of private property or economic freedom;738 and 
(4) must not originate from economic policy that deliberately intervenes with the free 
market or favors specific industries or companies, thereby violating legal equality.739   
The statutory exception must be suitable and necessary to achieve the legislative objective, and the 
repression of economic freedom is necessary to reach that objective.740 Since Switzerland lacks 
ordinary judicial review powers, the Swiss courts share analogous judicial powers as New Zealand 
courts: the judge may only recommend that the Federal Assembly amend the conflicting federal 
law or scrutinize the law until it can be applied harmoniously with the constitution.741  
Similar to American states, the cantons can set higher requirements than Article 36 on 
permissible cantonal actions restricting the right to property.742 One commentator has found that 
the Article 36 protection is a parchment right since a popular referendum – which the Federal 
Assembly fails to question and succumbs to political pressure – would be difficult to overturn on 
the indefinite “reasonableness” and “public interests” test under Article 36.743 Compared to the 
U.S., which only questions the taking’s public use, the judicial considerations of the right’s core, 
essence, and proportionality with the government’s objectives offer more for landowners to 
dispute. 
How property is affected may change the remedy for infringements of economic freedom. 
Quotas on meat and egg production were considered an economic management question, not a 




material expropriation of the farmer’s chattel usage; thus, compensation was not a potential 
remedy.744 Under a property impairment theory, compensation for the lost production is possible, 
especially if one or a few farmers were affected.745 The farmer can further rebut the issue if she 
proves that the property regime’s change was severe and abrupt.746 On non-residential property, 
economic freedom could raise a claim that expropriations interfere with the citizenry’s pursuit of 
private economic activity or are anti-competitive when the private beneficiary is related to the 
landowner’s business competitor.747 A sole-proprietor’s free choice to locate her business 
wherever is a guaranteed constitutional right notwithstanding preexisting zoning regulations.748 
Economic Freedom & Zoning. The constitutional guarantee of economic freedom can 
save the landowner from unconstitutional zoning laws that intervene in economic competition:749 
e.g.,  a canton should not promote certain industries through zoning.750 Judges can evaluate land-
use regulations with an economic-impairing effect to analyze whether the regulation’s necessity 
outweighs the economic impact.751 Commercial-political policy disguised as spatial planning 
obstructs the development of a meaningful land-use regime and are not tolerated.752 Although 
rejecting activities in particular zones restrict commerce, they are upheld as constitutional since a 
spatial plan must designate properties into different zones, and the plan cannot block all market 
competition.753 The Supreme Court has issued conflicting opinions on this matter. A city’s denial 
of building demolishment, which favored the local industry, was affirmed as constitutional.754 
Cultural policy can reject competitors from purchasing property to engage in certain industries.755 
The government can reduce the zoning size for that industry, conclude an objective reason why 
fewer customers would be found in the planned location, or allege that the competitor does not 
target the same customers as the local competitor because it charges higher or lower prices than 
the locals.756 These government options circumvent breaches of economic freedom: a freedom 




intended to stop State encumbrances against business activity on property.757 Therefore, zoning 
regulations must consider the intentional or unintentional economic side effects to uphold the right 
to economic freedom.758 The right does not compensate the victim for the wrongdoing committed, 
but a separate statute may reimburse the victim for the corresponding losses derived from the 
economic freedom violation.759  
Nationalization. For expropriation purposes, Switzerland struggles at any attempt to 
nationalize commercial enterprises – unlike New Zealand – because their constitutional right to 
economic freedom and the right to a market-based economy prioritize the private arrangements.760 
Switzerland found no historical, compelling rationale to nationalize private activities.761 Thus, 
economic freedom may aid the landowner’s challenge of the expropriation’s necessity and 
proportionality when the expropriation jeopardizes the landowner’s profession or contractual 
interests.762  
Equal Treatment Under the Law. A Swiss landowner may also plead discrimination or 
unequal treatment.763 To prevail, the landowner would need to prove that the court found legal 
distinctions when the important, distinguishable facts did not arise to opine a different outcome, 
or the legal distinctions that could alter the judgment were omitted from the legal reasoning.764 
The Swiss have federal and cantonal constitutional rights to an independent and impartial tribunal 
during a proceeding,765 and an unlawful exercise of federal judiciary power may result in the 
federal government paying proprietary damages from the unlawful decision.766 Without many 
challenges to judicial immunity, a judge would probably be removed for obvious or repeated 
discriminations in expropriation decisions.767  
If landowners are treated differently under the same circumstances, then compensation can 
redress the unequal treatment.768 If the landowner sacrifices more than other victims in the 




community, then compensation should account for the asymmetrical burden to the landowner, 
which benefitted the community,769 or the statute’s unintended consequences that create gross 
inequality.770 For zoning purposes, the equal protection article has a negligible effect in defending 
landowners since dividing properties into zones is fundamentally discriminatory against similar 
neighboring properties,771 and the similar parcels can be treated differently based on their possible 
future use.772 Equal protection scrutiny emerges when the municipality divides the jurisdiction into 
zones, the municipality freezes the expansion of certain zones (e.g., to halt building permits), and 
the municipality renders a justification for the asymmetrical treatment or expansion between the 
zones.773 The Federal Constitution’s Equal Treatment clause only applies to governments; thus, 
the private entity exercising expropriation powers likely cannot violate the equal treatment clause 
when expropriating.774 Concomitantly, the federal agency approving and overseeing the private 
entity’s expropriation would be held accountable for equal protection violations.775 The equal 
protection clause will apply in expropriation cases, but whether the third-party expropriator, 
serving as the State’s actor, can directly violate the equal treatment clause appears to be 
unanswered.776 Generally, any administrative action prohibits arbitrariness and unequal treatment 
and mandates good faith dealings with the expropriated persons.777 Waiving these requirements 
would unlawfully restrict fundamental rights, breaching Article 36 of the Federal Constitution.778  
Zoning Taxes. The federal government demanded the Cantons to tax the landowner for 
any appreciation in the land derived from the rezoning plan.779 The tax eliminates the capital gain 
windfall when the property is sold as a building zone with less construction and land-use 
restrictions.780 The tax increases the property’s cost basis it is paid to develop the property under 
a permit, or the tax is paid when the parcel is later sold, deducting the payable capital gains taxes 
on the land sale.781 The objective is to equalize landowners when one landowner benefited from a 




particularized governmental act or to have the landowner pay for the government’s special benefit 
to that parcel.782 Landowners should neither suffer a loss nor gain a profit from the government’s 
zoning plan.783 Detrimentally, the landowner may have no participation or prior knowledge of the 
rezoning or changes in land-use, but the landowner can expect at least a 20% value-added tax on 
the land’s appreciation from the beneficial rezoning784 and cantons might contrive advantageous 
value with permits or land settings to tax the landowners more with unanticipated governmental 
benefits.785 Cantonal attempts to exempt persons from paying the value-added tax have 
contravened federal law, making corrective government action potentially taxable.786 Currently, 
the Cantons can waive the tax if tax collection is unprofitable.787 
Here, the landowner takes the new cantonal permits, land settings, or zoning benefits that 
it may never have petitioned: an involuntary benefit.788 The landowner will incur greater property 
taxes for the ongoing advantage, which increases the property’s taxable value. The government 
benefits from the value-added tax and the adjusted tax revenues from the rezoning.789  
Compensation for Expropriations. Switzerland offers immense coverage for 
expropriations and excessive regulatory takings. It can be summarized as full compensation for 
the confiscated property,790 plus special damages and other quantum of damages to other property, 
plus a surcharge for the involuntary expropriation on condition that every condemnee is treated 
equally by the amount of and qualifications for the surcharge.791 Full compensation arrives in cash 
computed as the market value minus encumbrances,792 recurring services, or like-kind transactions 
– particularly for lost agricultural businesses.793 Landowners can demand compensation for lost 
future business income,794 lost special zoning benefits, relocation costs, and architect costs for 
adapting the new premises for the condemnee.795 Expropriating special property, such as farmland, 
may require an in-kind benefit based on the replacement’s availability and if the judge deems it 




appropriate.796 The Federal Supreme Court reduced the landowner’s burden of proof for difficult-
to-prove harms and construed evidentiary ambiguities in the condemnee’s favor: e.g., when 
physical damage can neither be proven nor revoked.797 
Buyback Procedure. In the Expropriation Act, the landowner has one year to demand the 
condemned property be returned to her if the property has not been put into service within the 
government’s deadline (approximately five years plus extensions), the surplus property has not 
added-on to a public work within 25 years, or the property has been discharged of its public 
interest.798 Therefore, the expropriator can abandon the property and wait about 25 years to 
implement the plan to expand the public work with the new land.799 No work plan is necessary, 
and any prepared plans are non-binding.800 If the government changes the public interest, the 
landowner can demand reacquiring the condemned property one-year after the landowner knows 
that the expropriator conveyed the property to a third-party or the property’s public interest has 
been relocated or changed.801 The expropriator must notify the landowner, at her address,802 of the 
abandoned or changed public interest; the expropriator’s failure to provide notice and an 
opportunity for the condemnees to repurchase their property results in a compensation award to 
the condemnees when the land is sold to someone else.803 The notice is required for replacing 
public interests because the expropriator lacks authority to decide whether the new public interest 
takes precedence over the landowner’s right to recovery.804 Additionally, the landowner may not 
receive adequate notice of the revised public interest justification without the notice. Case in point, 
the Supreme Court once treated the expropriator’s transfer to a third-party without a right to 
recovery as a new expropriation.805 The expropriator will compensate the landowner with the 
money it received from the sale in contravention of the notice requirement, excluding cost-of-
living adjustments.806 




Moreover, the expropriator must restore the property to its original condition before the 
expropriation unless the costs to restore the property would be monumental.807 When the property 
cannot be reasonably restored, the landowner may retain a fraction of the compensation award 
since the landowner holds the right to deduct the unrestored or inferior value of the property she 
is buying back.808 Any added value to the land may require the landowner to pay the expropriator 
more than the compensation award.809 Generally, the landowner returns the compensation 
received, excluding interest and a present adjustment for inflation, to repurchase her land.810 The 
landowner should ensure that any signed agreement with the expropriator does not relinquish the 
landowner’s right to recovery if the property has not been used for the intended purpose or not put 
into use.811  
Compensation & Zoning.  When a parcel is not within a building zone, the parcel is 
known as non-zoning regardless of its highest and best use.812 Non-zoning regulations are not 
compensable generally,813 and a landowner is not entitled to reassign her land for development, 
irrespective of its future potential.814 The Federal Supreme Court has found an expropriation-like 
effect on non-zoning land when the property is located in or near an urbanized built-up area, and 
a substantial investment in developing the lot has commenced.815  
To improve the landowners’ chances in litigation, the Supreme Court has recognized that, 
in special instances, the property should have been zoned, requiring a compensation award.816 In 
Billeter and Mitb, the Supreme Court ordered compensation to landowners of commercial, 
developed properties deemed non-zoning, contrary to the general rule.817 For decades, the 
properties were subject to the General Sewer Project and had lawfully acquired utility lines for the 
residential and commercial buildings; these were developed lands satisfying the statutory 
definition of a building zone, although lower court ruling and municipal classification concluded 




that the lands were non-zoning.818 The court’s consideration of the surrounding circumstances 
protects landowners from the Cantons’ nonrecognition of compensation since non-zoning lands 
do not presumptively experience expropriation-like land-use restrictions.819 
A practitioner would advocate that the non-zoned property qualifies as building zone 
property because (1) the lands can be or are connected to a sewer system,820 (2) the lands comply 
with the laws that protect water resources,821 and (3) the landowner has incurred considerable 
expenditures to develop the lands.822  
Compensation is required when a zoning plan revokes an existing right of ownership, when 
a potential use that would probably occur in the future was abolished, and when an exceptional 
hardship arose.823 Compensation computes the difference between the parcel’s value with and 
without the existing or expected usage rights.824 Property restrictions that neither disrupts the 
land’s current use, nor relinquishes ownership, nor imposes a special sacrifice of one landowner 
for the benefit of the community are known as public property restrictions.825 Minor land-use 
planning restrictions – e.g., groundwater protection and building code servicing health and safety 
– qualify as public property restrictions and are not compensable to the landowners.826  
Special Protections for Agriculture. Before commencing a project, the government must 
attempt to remedy the harm caused to protected priority interests such as forestry, natural beauty, 
and agricultural land.827 The municipalities can designate two zoning areas to agricultural land that 
contains no buildings, which enhances its protected status: Agricultural Zone and Protection 
Zone.828 One federal ordinance issues another test discouraging municipalities from redeveloping 
lands capable of crop rotation: Can the public interest reasonably be achieved without the land 
capable of crop rotations? Is the claimed area being used optimally? Is there a minimum share of 
crop rotation lands in the community?829 The Federal Assembly bestowed special privileges to 




farmland because a long-term, secure food base is vital to the country’s sustainability.830 If 
Switzerland’s food supply shorted, the country could make nutritional plans depending on the 
designated crop rotation areas.831  
The Elasticity of Property Theory832 contends that the Swiss constitutional right to 
property declares all land with inherent, natural rights that are restrained under regulations. When 
the government releases a property from regulations, the property does not create a new use rather 
it revives the landowner’s natural rights to the property.833 The right to property embeds a freedom 
to build on the property,834 and repealing a regulation returns the property to its original value with 
no windfall gain.835 Nonetheless, the landowner is taxed on the property’s restored unhampered 
condition.836 The counterargument states the tax assesses the landowner’s repossession of its 
inherent property rights, which offsets the inequality of neighboring landowners who have not 
repossessed their property rights from the regulation.837 The value-added tax would be 
substantially lower if the tax only recovered the structural planning costs or administrative costs.838 
No one would dispute that beneficiaries of public expenditure should pay to maintain the special 
benefits; however, planning measures that merely reclassify land-use opportunities are not 
burdening the general public or causing consequential damages to neighboring lands.839 The 
government may argue that the value-added tax funds the compensation paid to landowners for 
other expropriations or irreparable damages from modified land-uses,840 but the argument 
fallaciously assumes that the expropriation is not a burden borne by the whole public.841 Instead, 
the value-added tax singles-out individuals to fund a future expropriation regardless of whether 
those taxpayers are identifiable beneficiaries of the future expropriation and not the general 
public.842 




The Supreme Court did not dispute the Theory’s veracity, but it declined to recognize the 
claim based on practicality.843 Unless there’s a grave inequality or a foreseeable construction ban, 
a landowner cannot seek general compensation when her property is redefined, limiting the 
available land uses.844 Zurich’s Administrative Court expansively rejected the Theory on the 
grounds that property is not a preexisting natural right, and it must comply with the legal order and 
the constitutional spatial planning policy.845 This reasoning conflicts with the property is an 
institution constitutional principle, and it suggests that property rights are subservient to any new 
political order, even one that does not uphold private property.846 Besides violating the federal 
property standard, the government regulation could substantially encumber property or destroy its 
prior customary use forever, creating a material expropriation. 
Conclusion. Switzerland has far more authoritative defenses for landowners than any of 
the Studied Nations, and its judiciary persistently enforces them. The defenses cover the legal 
concept of property, competition, economic freedom, excessive zoning, nationalization of 
resources, equal protection, and good faith, non-arbitrary state action. Property has held a greater 
cultural and historical significance in Switzerland than in most European countries.847 Switzerland 
is a civil code country that offers greater property and contract protections than many common law 
countries, which is an outstanding accomplishment.848 Albeit imperfect, Switzerland has made 
continuous progressive efforts to defend landowners. In 2020, the Federal Assembly increased the 
compensation amount for agricultural land by three times the maximum value of comparable 
farmland.849 The Federal Assembly removed any conflicts of interests between the expropriators 
and the appraisal commissions by having the federal government pay the appraisal commission’s 
compensation, in lieu of the expropriators through fees.850 Unlike the U.S. and the Studied Nations, 
Switzerland successfully enacted binding federal legislation improving property rights. 






CHAPTER 6 – DISCUSSION 
 This section will analyze and incorporate the abovementioned data from Chapters 2 
through 5 to make general observations and answer the lessons learned from the Studied Nations. 
The research aimed to discover how the United States could improve its eminent domain regime 
by combining the best attributes or laws from each Studied Nation. The specific characteristics of 
these countries’ expropriation laws to be discussed here are: 
Constitutional Supremacy versus Parliamentary Supremacy. Switzerland, Singapore, 
and New Zealand have one or more of the following: parliamentary supremacy, weak judicial 
review, no direct votes for the executive branch, the legislature can easily amend the constitution, 
or restrict who qualifies for the executive branch leadership.851 This section will examine how 
these features may pose a threat to preserving property rights or any minority interests. The 
constitution behaves as the contract between the government limiting its power and the people 
securing certain rights and being a superior political authority to the government via its 
constitution, as amended.852 Constitutional supremacy aims to block most majoritarian hostility or 
repeal efforts at any time;853 therefore, a legal system enshrining the constitution should make the 
constitution a burdensome process to amend. An easily amendable constitution allows Parliament 
to repeal a provision directly, instead of by statute under parliamentary supremacy. Constitutional 
supremacy has no standard amendment procedure; nonetheless, the amendment procedure should 
require the federal government and the people, or the subnational legislatures, to have a 
supermajority vote on amendments with no opportunity for a total revision to better preserve the 
constitution.854 As an illustration, all substate constitutions in federations are easier to amend than 
the federal constitution.855 Most U.S. state constitutions only require a unicameral legislative 




supermajority (over half, three-fifths, or Delaware’s three-fourths majority vote) with no separate 
vote to approve the amendment – a public referendum or the county councils’ votes.856 Without 
multiple groups voting on the amendment, akin to a proposed U.S. federal amendment, it is 
unsurprising that under 40% of U.S. states preserved their original constitution, and all but three 
states have substantially increased the number of amendments over time.857 When a constitution 
is easy to amend, the constitution is a statute without constitutional constraints,858 which supports 
Thomas Jefferson’s contention to have a living, evolving constitution for the states and not the 
federal government.859 Otherwise, people and foreign investors would question the sustainability 
of the minimum constitutional guarantees. 
A difficult-to-amend constitution, which is the supreme law of the land, may lead to 
judicial supremacy where an official other than the legislature interprets and publishes the final 
word about whether governmental acts are unconstitutional.860 A nation has some variation of 
judicial supremacy when an official, like a judge, can overturn parliamentary acts and contributes 
to the unwritten constitution through the common law with the official’s temperaments 
overleaping the constitution or legislation.861 A constitution is customarily antimajoritarian; thus, 
the constitution or legal culture assigning unelected judges as the guardians of the document is 
intentionally the most undemocratic means to preserve that spirit.862 Under parliamentary 
supremacy, the constitution and the judiciary cannot conflict with or impede other parliamentary 
acts since it bears no higher authority above other laws.863 Parliament could ignore the right to 
property because the right holds no greater authoritativeness than the other legislation. Parliament 
is always correct and can never bind itself to prohibit future legislation, making constitutional 
constraints powerless.864 If James Madison’s and Alexis de Tocqueville’s warnings about the 
tyranny-of-the-majority are correct (see infra), constitutional property rights urge a country to 




adopt constitutional supremacy with judicial authority to overturn parliamentary acts that are 
forbidden per the constitution.865 This authority is distinct from judicial supremacy because the 
judge merely exercises judicial review, applying the plain meaning of the constitution as 
preempting all other, conflicting legislation.866 Otherwise, with parliamentary supremacy, one 
administration could repeal the right to property by statute or through a unilateral amendment. The 
United States’ anomalous separation of powers entrenches the federal constitution against political 
pressure or evolving popular opinions.867  
Judicial review or supremacy is not an irrefutable defense against government 
manipulation. A judiciary can openly accept legislation that degrades property rights because of 
political ideology, entryism, bribes,868 and honest mistakes of law or injecting words into the 
constitution.869 Singapore and the United States offer constitutional supremacy where the courts 
can find legislative and executive acts unconstitutional, but both countries have complementary 
corrections for each other’s respective issues. Singapore’s court system is more consistent and less 
political, while the U.S. Supreme Court has become politicized.870 Singapore courts practice more 
judicial restraint and originalism yet are open to international legal interpretations as persuasive 
evidence.871 The Judges do not legislate from the bench or seek to optimize rights between 
compelling policy interests; however, they do not defer to Parliament to correct or answer legal 
problems.872  The Singapore Courts may be disinclined to invalid statutes since Parliament 
amended the Constitution to restrict the “courts’ supervisory jurisdiction” on a subject in response 
to the Court of Appeals overturning legislation about that subject.873 Contrary to the United 
States,874 Singapore’s Parliament can unilaterally amend most parts of the constitution with a two-
thirds majority vote.875 Thus, Parliament can amend the constitutional conflict before enacting 
their new legislation if they acquire a two-thirds majority parliamentary vote. If the U.S. could 




make the judiciary more Singaporean, uniform with textualism and less political entrenchment, 
constitutional property rights would have a better resilience against degrading legislative acts. U.S. 
judges exercise their judicial powers without hesitation of Congress revoking them; thus, the 
problem is inconsistency among the judges with enforcing the constitution as-written. The current 
U.S. strategy of tossing statutes at the courts to see what is acceptable for the current justices 
establishes a custom of chiseling at the foundation of property rights with new ideas unfounded in 
the written instrument.876 Madison held concerns about the constant attack of constitutional rights 
through amendments or appeals, making the economic costs of decision-making uncertain when 
developing or purchasing property for the long-term.877 Therefore, a constitutional property right 
is not the all-inclusive defense against arbitrary eminent domain.878 Nonetheless, a constitutional 
right to property remains imperative in a constitutional or parliamentary supremacy jurisdiction. 
New Zealand and Singapore judges have not enforced common law property rights to rectify the 
hardships caused by the legislature’s inertia at legislating strong property rights when no 
constitutional right to property exists. A nation’s success at upholding the right predicts the right’s 
power, resilience, and innovation879 throughout a nation’s history.  
A return to textualist, traditional interpretations of U.S. eminent domain law would revive 
or add new property protections. An international interpretation is the Swiss Elasticity of Property 
Theory. First, the United States does not tax rezoning because there was no realized income from 
the governmental activity to the landowner. This trashes the practicality complaint that repelled 
the Swiss Supreme Court from affirming the Theory officially. Second, the U.S. accepts property 
as an inherent natural right, meaning the request to perform certain activities on the property is a 
restoration of the property’s unencumbered nature from zoning laws. Minimizing bureaucracy and 
paperwork to use the land as intended dignifies the foundational legal principle that property is an 




inherent right and facilitates a preference towards productive private activity, even personal use, 
unless there is a countervailing government interest: e.g., abating a nuisance or trespass.880 
The Property Guarantee. Property guarantees in the federal and subnational constitutions 
safeguard distinct procedures depending on the government actor: a state taking compared to a 
federal agency taking. Two guarantees (federal and subnational) increase the number of distinct 
defenses to investigate the infringement, especially when the state provision is more expansive881 
and interpreted differently than the federal constitution.882 Ideally, The Singapore and United 
States principle of having other constitutional rights applied to property would create a two-part 
defense: a right to property and a right to constitutional interests in that property, such as non-
discriminatory treatment in expropriation land selection. The United States supplements the 
defense with a finding of property interest with a person’s other constitutional rights since the 
constitution applies to the people.883 
Switzerland extends the right to property to deleterious regulatory takings at the federal 
level, and some cantons prohibit private-to-private takings identical to some U.S. states. The Swiss 
constitution harmoniously permits zoning regulations and compensates landowners when the land-
use restrictions create an appreciable impairment to property interests. Therefore, municipal 
zoning that bars most use and development of property constitutes a taking, even when the title 
remains unaltered. Switzerland estimates a loss in property value exceeding 20% as the transition 
between a reasonable land-use regulation and an indirect expropriation. The U.S. cases where 90% 
or more of the property lost its present utility would not prevail under the Swiss test, even if the 
threshold rose to 50%.884 Compensation for regulatory takings is imperative given the lower 
judicial scrutiny and near-limitless inconveniences imposed. The U.S. constitution does not 
reference regulatory takings, and usually, no compensation award is guaranteed when a regulatory 




taking occurs. The regulation is justified under the state’s police power, and the landowner kept 
the property title, meaning the regulation is not a per se expropriation. Defenses recognizing 
compensation for regulatory takings and severe land devaluations would persuade judges, who 
only have unsound equity arguments, to combat regulatory takings that may be overturned with 
the municipality’s appeal. 
Switzerland extends property as an institutional right and order of economic freedom, 
meaning no society in the present or future can restructure property under a centrally planned 
system or empty property of its wealth creation abilities. This gives property the status of a national 
interest instead of a revocable privilege or gift. Switzerland is a civil law country with 
parliamentary supremacy; thus, the Federal Assembly could enact laws that conflict with the 
constitutional right, and Switzerland prefers popular initiatives over judicial supremacy.885 Under 
the common law or a constitutional economic order, society’s connection to property dictates how 
the government branches should treat property despite the weak legislative protections. In 
Singapore, public outrage and publicity made the ex gratia payments politically profitable: without 
a legal obligation to pay additional compensation, the government provided some recourse to 
alleviate the unintended consequences.886 A true dictatorial regime would have ignored the 
public’s complaints, notwithstanding its moral sentiments about property. Meanwhile, 
Singaporean society and its administrative agencies validated property’s importance when the 
autonomous, normative response to expropriation abuse was benevolence. The U.S., Singapore, 
and Switzerland set out to foster a free-market system, but each has managed expropriation with 
distinct approaches. Switzerland and some U.S. states have a comprehensive compensation 
scheme with constitutional affirmation, while Singapore paid below fair market value for a large 
portion of the country and barred landowners from easily questioning the taking’s legitimacy. 




Swiss economic freedom and property-as-an-institution offer more reasons to cure direct and 
indirect expropriations equitably, and judges have adjudicated the various circumstances with 
persistence at respecting property rights.  
Due Process. All Studied Nations share procedural due process protections. No matter the 
severity or scope of the taking, the landowner has an opportunity to be heard and at least one 
additional level of appellate review. The government’s expropriation is invalid when it fails to 
comply with the landowner’s procedural rights to notice, a hearing, and a non-discriminatory 
selection when expropriating specific parcels.887 Unlike a right to property or compensation, the 
Studied Nations equate access to justice and procedural rights throughout the taking as a 
requirement of natural justice.888 The use of international agreements may heighten the standard 
of judicial review for property and supplant the difficulties in ratifying a quasi-constitutional 
property protection.889 The controversy surrounding the inclusion of property rights into 
international rights demonstrates the potential authoritativeness of ratified international treaties on 
courts worldwide.890 
Due process has been used in the U.S. to create economic constitutional rights. Regulating 
business without a legitimate, necessary public interest can violate the state constitution’s due 
process clauses.891 The Texas Constitution’s due process clause replicates the Swiss constitutional 
protection of economic freedom. Economic regulations violate Texan substantive due process 
when “the statute's actual, real-world effect … is so burdensome [to the victim] as to be oppressive 
in light of, the governmental interest[.]”892 In Tennessee, regulations must have a substantial 
relation to the public interest that the government intends to protect, and it cannot rely on an 
unsubstantiated, generic claim that the regulation will benefit public health, safety, or morals.893 
Overall, U.S. states have enacted provisions to protect economic freedom when the federal 




government remains silent; meanwhile, the Swiss have a standalone federal right to economic 
freedom.894 Most state due process clauses do not substantiate a right to economic freedom, 
meaning each state varies in its reasoning to preserve economic interests.895 The Swiss federal 
rights are outstanding, but the omission of cantonal protections offers fewer layers of protection if 
a federal statute or referendum quashed the normative federal rights.896 
Public Use. The public use justification should be prescriptive to avoid vague terms 
encompassing indefinite state activities. A country with judicial review may require the judge to 
act with judicial supremacy as she guesses and establishes common law tests about when activities 
qualify as unconstitutional takings. Not all government actions qualify as public uses, but when 
Parliament fails to enumerate the bases to expropriate, Parliament is deferring to the judiciary to 
decide when the government acts unconstitutionally. If Parliament makes a broad statute and the 
judiciary gives deference to Parliament, then public use challenges have no foreseeable success. 
The United States’ traditional public use test was the most restrained and directive definition, but 
today, the federal government and the states have implemented either a public use and public 
benefits test, or a consolidated public purpose test. In essence, the public use test looks for a public 
right of access or “asks whether the public has a right to a definite use of the condemned 
property[.]”897 The public benefits test “asks whether some benefit accrues to the public as a result 
of the desired condemnation[.]”898 The public benefits test enlarged the scope of permissible 
expropriations to contentious benefits, such as more employment and increased property taxes. 
All the Studied Nations recognize blight to justify expropriations. It is only U.S. states 
– Florida and New Mexico – that have prohibited blight justifications, and instead, municipalities 
exercise their power-to-abate-nuisances to stop health and safety problems. As an alternative, the 
Institute for Justice’s Model Eminent Domain Legislation mirrored other state laws itemizing the 




type of building code violations that qualify a parcel as blight,899 which converts “blight” from a 
catch-all to a well-defined term.  
The legislature should prescribe features on land that qualify as blight and how the 
municipality allocates sufficient time for the landowner to fix those features.900 For instance, in 
Minnesota, blight exists when remedying building code violations would cost over 50% of the 
assessed property value to restore the property to the building code compliance.901 Thus, an unkept 
indigent house that generates fewer property taxes is not automatically blighted for eminent 
domain purposes unless curing the defects warrant purchasing a new house. Governments should 
test blight parcel-by-parcel to not punish one non-blight property near blight properties; otherwise, 
compliance with municipal ordinances does not reward the landowner for maintaining her home 
or business. All the Studied Nations have vaguer public use tests, making the U.S. modern trend 
the prevailing international trend. Although the law should uphold private rights instead of 
destroying them, landowners can request – at least – an adequate, secure remedy from the 
weakened public use test.902 
Private-to-Private Takings. All the Studied Nations allow private-to-private takings, with 
Singapore being the most unrestrained and Switzerland having the most government oversight. 
Singapore has allowed any government request to be a valid public use while Switzerland requires 
private plans to be reviewed and monitored by the applicable government agency as a condition to 
taking someone else’s land.903 Most U.S. states reject Kelo’s application in their state procedures 
by statute or constitutional amendment.  
Besides restoring the traditional U.S. public use standard, the people should vote on 
legislative language that specifies the activities constituting a public use. A public vote on eminent 
domain justifications requires more citizens to contemplate the issue and facilitates more external 




oversight of the legislation or ordinances – the legislature and the people vote similar to a 
constitutional amendment. However, such a vote could threaten property rights based on how the 
legislature designed the proposed public use statute. Absolute discretion to the legislature to draft 
public uses has led to broad, limitless terms in the Subject Nations and the Kelo case.904 The Swiss 
process allows both the government and the people to participate in the determination of a public 
use through a referendum; however, defining the public use in the constitution may conflict with 
the existing constitutional right to property. A right to property was added to the 1960 
Constitutional revision to ensure the cantonal, traditional guarantee of property withstands the new 
federal zoning powers.905 The public interest is given no higher weight than the right to property,906 
but a court may prioritize the constitutional public interest over the right to property unless the 
judge considers property sacred to a free government.907  Likewise, Parliament may unilaterally 
designate specific land-uses as national interests. More public participation or judicial scrutiny of 
the eminent domain power908 can prevent absolute or corrupt outcomes: e.g., the government’s 
eminent domain notice is sufficient evidence of an indisputable, legitimate taking. The only risk 
in this approach is the propertyless-majority voting with disinterest about what happens to private 
property they do not own. 
The Holdout Problem. As a reminder from Chapter 2, a holdout arises when an 
expropriator must acquire numerous, contiguous parcels of land from different landowners before 
the project’s development.909 One or a few landowners negotiate greater sales proceeds than other 
landowners, or the landowners’ counteroffer of sales proceeds exceed the fair market value of the 
property.910 The probability of a holdout increases proportionally as the number of landowners, 
who must forcibly sell their property, increases.911 The landowners’ refusal to sell their property 




voluntarily to the expropriator may thwart or delay the project enough to make the project 
unprofitable to complete.912  
The landowner will overprice their property while the government will underprice, and this 
offer-price-versus-ask-price disparity is the endowment effect.913 In a holdout, the landowner’s 
refusal could be motivated by sentimental value to the land, insecurity about the landowner’s 
replacement home or business, or a profit motive.914 An expropriator’s spontaneous offer to 
purchase the property subjects the landowner to an anchoring bias915 regardless of any profit 
motive.916 The landowner may be uninformed about her property’s market value and presume the 
expropriator’s offer as approximating market value.917 Expropriators are incentivized to underbid 
since the landowner will normally negotiate with a higher asking price. The uninformed 
landowner’s counteroffer will approximate the fair-market-value of the land as a result of the 
anchoring bias.918 Holding the landowner’s motivations constant, a landowner will increase her 
sale price the longer she negotiates or delays the negotiation,919 or when the landowner litigates 
the expropriator’s price offer.920 This may explain why New Zealand has a generous signing bonus 
for landowners agreeing to the compensation package within six months of their notice of intent 
to take the land. The signing bonus discourages landowners from litigating the expropriation for 
the extra percentage points of compensation. 
Despite the holdout problem, “[t]he usual presumption is that the exploitation risk is greater 
than the holdout risk[,]” according to Professor Richard Epstein.921 The government’s unchecked 
taxing and eminent domain powers allowed the private expropriator to claim tax exemptions or 
government contracts with the newly expropriated land.922 Eminent domain has been a negotiation 
tactic to threaten litigation with the landowners for disagreeing with the presented offer – 
establishing no good faith negotiation.923 Landowners will bargain due to threatened litigation, 




which causes indigent landowners, who cannot afford to litigate, to relinquish their property below 
fair market value.924 Landowners can retaliate by overinvesting in the condemned property before 
the valuation date, thereby increasing the assessed value, because the landowners have no other 
bargaining power.925 Therefore, municipalities should refrain from threats or exercises of eminent 
domain until the holdout problem becomes unmanageable.926 The public use test was intended to 
preserve private property, not to mitigate holdout liabilities,927 especially when expropriators have 
other strategies to confront holdouts: secret buying agents and option agreements.928 New Zealand, 
Switzerland, and U.S. policies encourage good faith negotiations with landowners, finding 
coercive government actions illegal or unconstitutional. The real issue is ensuring good faith 
negotiations occur when indigent landowners cannot afford to litigate breaches of good faith and 
fair-dealing.   
Proportionality & Judicial Review. The Swiss proportionality requirement, balancing the 
important private interests with the necessary public interests,929 demands consideration of the 
private interests and other public interests before an expropriation and regulatory taking becomes 
effective.930 Therefore, the public interest justification must demonstrate stronger reasoning when 
the private interests are disproportionally impacted, suffering a greater harm. The government’s 
obligation not to expropriate more than what is required to achieve the public interest further 
restricts the ability of an expropriating authority to use a public interest justification to take surplus 
land or for the government to hoard land.931 In the U.S., governments cannot condemn more land 
than what is needed to complete the public work.932 Nevertheless, the Kelo and Berman cases 
granted the State legislatures the power to determine the quantity of land necessary for a public 
project, making project plans difficult to disprove.933 State legislatures have ratified statutes 
permitting excess condemnations to save the government money.934 In New Zealand, all land taken 




for a public work must be required in some way to fulfill the public work now or in the future, 
even if the property is only used in construction or to relocate another public work.935 In Singapore, 
the government can take more land than necessary to achieve the public purpose,936 but the 
landowner can object to the taking’s size.937 Overall, the American Maxim is the international 
benchmark, “It is the principle of all free governments, that no right of the citizen should be 
surrendered to the sovereign, that is not necessary for the purposes of government.”938 
In theory, the proportionality test is unilateral protection customarily favoring the 
landowner;939 however, proportionality with vague interest balancing could be used against 
landowners: such as combining the interests of the private beneficiary and the public benefits of 
urban development. Balancing tests may undermine property rights and supplant the legislature 
with an immutable officer deciding the new scope of property regulations.940 Contrarily, absolute 
discretion to government agencies removes all potential policy arguments to defend low-income 
landowners from expropriations.941 As a recommendation, the proportionality test should exclude 
the private beneficiary’s interests throughout a private-to-private taking.942 Stricter judicial review 
is warranted in private-to-private takings, if legal in the jurisdiction, though a different judicial 
treatment remains unseen in the Studied Nations.   
The Swiss and U.S. statutes express what actions qualify as a public use because the 
democratic representative identifies its constituents’ public interests, unlike a judge or the state 
actor.943 Switzerland’s public vote on constitutional public interests adds more barriers to adding 
new public interests that could be used against the rights to property and economic freedom. 
Nevertheless, the legislature must clearly define what qualifies as a public interest so that both the 
executive and the judiciary do not need to guess what activities satisfy an overly broad definition. 
Amending the enumerated lists of public uses with a legislative and public vote could eliminate 




broad eminent domain justifications on condition that the legislatures do not propose a broad 
myriad of public uses to ensure no project is stalled based on a technicality.944 Under constitutional 
and judicial supremacy, judges have an imperative duty to find whether the legislature’s public 
interest:  
(1) violates the constitution,  
(2) interferes with the fundamental rights of third-parties or minority interests,  
(3) is used by a government agency to exceed its authority or to impose unreasonable 
restrictions,  
(4) ensures the eminent domain power is exercised for a designated public use and not a 
pretext, or  
(5) is necessary and beneficial to the community.945  
Undoubtedly, when given the opportunity, legislatures will draft broad public use statutes, but the 
court may need to have a judicial test for ambiguous public use statutes946 or to construe 
ambiguities and proportionality in the landowner’s favor.947 A statute authorizing expropriation to 
create housing or a cemetery,948 for example, is definite and easier to test compared to “any 
economic development.”949 The court validates an unenumerated governmental action and the 
public use when it allows a public interest justification not expressly within the statute. Lower 
courts tend to enunciate the vague statutory rules, and indigent condemnees lack the funds to 
appeal to higher appellate courts that may deviate from the all-encompassing statute on policy 
grounds.950 The judge holds an overwhelming power when someone risks home eviction or 
business closure based on that judge’s opinion. The jurisdiction becomes “tyrannical, and exposed 
to vast abuses” when the judges and municipality fail to respect private property as contracted 
between the government and its people.951 As the Supreme Court of Illinois once found, “[i]t is 




incumbent upon the judiciary to ensure that the power of eminent domain is used in a manner 
contemplated by the framers of the constitutions and by the legislature that granted the specific 
power in question.”952 In short, for broad public uses, a heightened standard of review is necessary 
to preserve the public use test as a government limitation, to punish the legislature for seeking 
administrative convenience and to verify that the public and not the private interests are being 
advanced.953 In favor of landowners, Switzerland and some U.S. states correctly eliminate the 
discretion endowed in government agencies. Ideally, the people or landowners will have input via 
votes on what specific works specifically qualify for the public use statute without risking the right 
to property with a broad public use proposal.  
Public Ownership, Private Operation. Nobody reasonably agrees to have private-to-
private takings due to government lobbies, bribes, or mala fides;954 however, some people may 
prefer the private-sector to operate the public work after the expropriation is completed.955 
Privatizing commercial-in-nature government functions would comply with the constitutional 
economic order and grant lawsuits against the public work’s injurious affection without 
governmental immunities.956 The problem is how a private activity has been deemed a public work. 
Somehow one person’s business activity is more important to the public than another person’s 
business or livelihood.957 Justice Thomas’s actual use test would be easier to administer to avoid 
injustice: either the general public has a right to access the property, or the government owns the 
property while it or the private sector conduct the public work.958 When the use is no longer 
necessary, the landowner can repurchase property interest. The actual use would nationalize some 
property, but it allows separation of the profits and ownership. The government owns the property 
until that specific public work is no longer productive, while the private company cannot hold the 
land as a balance sheet investment: i.e., property, land, and equipment. Neither the public nor 




private entities benefit absolutely from the compelled consumption of someone else’s condemned 
property. The private sector’s possessory interest ends after the public use has been exhausted. 
Once the private sector leaves or does not renew the lease, the landowner may notice the public 
work’s abandonment visually or through a paper trail, entitling her to the buyback procedures from 
that lapsed renewal date.  
What about government ownership of natural resources and delegating the management 
and profit to a private company? New Zealand and Singapore enables state-nationalized resources, 
but the U.S. and Switzerland would probably consider a state’s mass confiscation of a certain 
property interest as unconstitutional.959 To be sure, a public use test should ban substantial state 
ownership of natural resources, for it limits private competition, individual use, and new market 
entrants.960 Nationalizing property to solely lease it back to the current owner does not create a 
beneficial public use. Using rents or royalties to increase public revenues would contravene the 
constitutional economic order, economic freedom, and the security of property. The resumption or 
abolishment of a property interest is a grave offense to all of these rights.  
The eminent domain power should be kept separate from private persons. The U.S. and 
New Zealand sometime separate the private entities from the compulsory acquisition power, while 
Singapore and Switzerland tolerate a private expropriator power subject to some administrative 
review. Although Singapore and Switzerland appear to have no cases of private entities 
committing fraud when they wielded the expropriation power, landowners have better security 
with government oversight and control of the power than a private entity persistently applying to 
execute the expropriation power through different legislations.961  
Leasing. None of the Studied Nations discuss leasing in lieu of expropriation as a solution. 
Leasing the condemnee’s land, instead of expropriating the property, could compensate the 




landowner throughout the forced lease term at the leasehold’s net rental value through rents or 
royalties. Analogously, the Japanese or South Korean Land Readjustment systems incentivize 
landowners to cure their blighted neighborhood independently.962 Neighboring proprietors 
voluntarily assemble their land for redevelopment in exchange for a proportionate share of all the 
accumulated land to enjoy or sell, at higher property values, after the rehabilitation.963 Landowners 
who reject the Land Readjustment may receive the standard compensation scheme.964 The problem 
is the private company’s option to expropriate the land whenever the adjusted rent or royalties 
become too high, or negotiations reach a stalemate.965 The government may decide to keep the 
rental income as government revenue by acquiring title and leasing the property to the private 
company.966  
Other Protections. Switzerland has the most versatile constitutional protections of private 
property. The federal right to property expressly mandates full compensation for expropriations 
and regulatory takings reflecting the same harms as an expropriation. An institutional guarantee, a 
market-economy legal order, and an assurance that wealth can be accumulated are constitutional 
doctrines protecting property rights. Article 35 of the Constitution carries the property protections 
throughout the legal system and obliges the government to draft and interpret laws in compliance 
with these doctrines. The right to economic freedom safeguards property used to conduct a 
profession: e.g., a small business or farming. The Spatial Planning Act gifts farmland special 
protective status as a public interest and preserves the profession and the nation’s food supply. 
Many U.S. states have outstanding nuanced protections as well, but they are spread across each 
state: Missouri recognizes heritage value, Michigan offers a compensation premium, Oregon pays 
for regulatory takings, and the Texan due process clause alleviates harms to economic freedom.  




The United States has used the Fourteenth Amendment to create unenumerated 
constitutional rights and equitable principles to restore economic constitutional rights.967 The 
Swiss have used their constitutional legal equality to protect adversely affected landowners. Legal 
equality demands compensation for the landowners’ disproportionate public burden when a few 
landowners incur unique hardships from a property ordinance.968 The United States relies solely 
on the Takings Clause, instead of equal protection like Switzerland, when a regulation eliminates 
all economic viable uses for a few proprietors.969 Conversely, legal equality impacts the cantons 
from offering more compensation than the federal standard through an automatic compensation 
premium. The U.S. state constitutional premia970 would not comply with legal equality,971 making 
the U.S. outperform Switzerland compensation where state expropriations exceed fair market 
value. A federal signing bonus could apply to Swiss federal expropriations because, like New 
Zealand, the federal laws cannot conflict given stringent parliamentary supremacy.972  
U.S. states that offer a compensation premium rectify many hardships that may otherwise 
be unrecoverable: business goodwill, lost profits, relocation costs, sentimental value, or the 
government’s undervaluation of the property. The higher compensation requirement will 
discourage poorly planned expropriations or land hoarding. Most states abhor excess 
condemnation as an investment.973 The constitutional requirement for limiting and compensating 
eminent domain ensures that the rights are self-executing. The legislature does not need to 
authorize recovery for a specific wrongdoing. The taking or inverse condemnation creates a duty 
to pay compensation.974 The common people need more autonomous processes since busy 
lifestyles and the lack of legal expertise makes monitoring the eminent domain procedure a futile, 
overwhelming endeavor.975 One collective problem with the U.S. and Switzerland is the variability 
in notice requirements. In the U.S., surveys and searches for the word land use in state appellate 




decisions reflect the prevalence of eminent domain in research.976 However, this erroneously 
presumes landowners appeal or notify the world of their expropriation cases or regulatory takings. 
Some landowners may capitulate out of fear, insufficient funds to litigate, or careless review of 
the agreement to expropriate. New Zealand and Singapore have gazettes that display all the notices 
and settlements to the public on expropriations conducted every year.977 For research into access 
to justice and eminent domain abuse, transparent reports of when a condemnation notice is issued 
and when a settlement is reached would accurately measure whether the problem is prevalent 
nationwide. 
Compensation. The Studied Nations and the United States, customarily, expect the 
expropriator to pay the fair market value of the confiscated property contemporaneous to the actual 
taking. The American jury trial could be sympathetic with the compensation award, but it is not 
required if a reasonable premium is awarded and costs related to the expropriation are reimbursed 
to the landowner. A jury trial may be superfluous when the compensation award indemnifies or 
enhances the landowner condition. The Studied Nations differ on their reimbursable consequential 
damages, including, but not limited to, valuation fees, relocation costs, lost profits, and goodwill. 
The above fair-market value bonuses hinder the government’s attempt to underestimate the 
property appraisal below fair market value and insures the landowner in the event some costs are 
not reimbursed.978 An expropriation regime’s objective should be to have the price indemnify the 
landowner and reflect the social cost of the public work.979 The government paying 5% less than 
fair market value does not account for the community or personal impact of the displacement, 
regardless of whether it adequately indemnifies the landowner.980 If the project is unnecessary, the 
government may be reneging its fundamental maxim to treat property as sacred.981 New Zealand’s 
compensation bonus has fixed monetary thresholds and requires the landowner to settle without 




litigation. If we put cultural differences aside, New Zealanders tend to execute a settlement for the 
signing bonus more often, potentially because the award is a reasonable substitute for disclaiming 
the land.982 This could support the proposition that a bonus of 22% alleviates the condemnee’s 
endowment effect – feeling under-compensated.983 New Zealander proprietors with residential 
properties approximating $205,000 or less would feel satisfied with the compensation bonus and 
settle. Meanwhile, some U.S. states and Swiss cantons charged the premium without the 
contingency of signing a settlement within six-months, like in New Zealand, and the premium 
increased as the government takes more land. Sentimental value is unpersuasive in most states, but 
the landowner can substantiate her years of residency or business occupancy as a legal test.984 New 
landowners, of six years or less, have no reason to acquire a premium on sentimental grounds 
because the time to foster a long-standing connection with the land is unfounded. Furthermore, the 
fair market value of landowner’s recently purchased land is less disputable – the compensation 
award will approximate the recent purchase price. The length of ownership as a precondition for a 
premium disincentivizes people purchasing land near expropriation projects in contemplation of 
holding out for the premium, especially insider-government-employees looking to capitalize on 
the undisclosed expropriation plan. Although the size of the premia relies on the legislature’s 
objectives, the research concludes that premiums or bonuses are practical and expected in high-
ranking countries concerning property rights. 
The judge should not depreciate the property’s appraised market value based on the 
government’s notice to the world about the expropriation, thereby influencing market prices. In 
Singapore, the public notice creates an expropriation discount for the government, but this fails to 
indemnify the landowner when she purchases a replacement residence or brick-and-mortar store 
at fair market value. Similarly, declaring capital improvements on the property as sentimental to 




reduce the compensation award does not redress the landowner’s relinquished betterment to the 
property.985 
Paradoxically, the U.S. federal government has the potential to produce a greater hardship 
to landowners than state and local expropriations. Most states reformed their laws after Kelo, and 
some states surpassed the top-ranking nations with premiums, heritage value, and consequential 
damages. Converting the Uniform Real Property Acquisition Policy from a guideline to binding 
rules could raise the United States’ rank in property rights and consequently ensure better 
protection of landowner rights. 
Inverse Condemnations. A better property rights arrangement would compensate 
expropriations and inverse condemnations for interfering with or depriving the owner of using the 
property. Interference is proven with the government’s physical invasion, property damage, or the 
stoppage of all the property’s economically viable uses.986 Switzerland and the U.S. acknowledge 
regulations can convert into an indirect expropriation when previous, current, or government-
notified future use is stunted, thwarted, or made impossible. The government’s gradual restrictions 
on the land’s use over the years could have a cumulative effect of taking the property, which should 
be a compensable regulatory taking. Switzerland’s over 20% reduced market value estimate may 
serve as the new baseline. In brief, the regulatory taking’s compensation award rehabilitates the 
landowner for the government’s breach of trust and ensures the government is not creating 
regulations to take land indirectly without paying compensation. In Switzerland, the compensation 
for regulatory takings is compensation for the government’s breach of trust,987 such as when the 
municipality changes a property zoning after applying for a development permit.988 If the 
regulation is unlawful, then similar to the Studied Nations, the landowner is seeking damages for 
the illegal regulation or taking.989 




The government should not attempt to bypass the compensation requirement. New Zealand 
and Singapore do not compensate regulatory takings unless the statute provides otherwise, making 
extensive regulations substantially cheaper than outright takings. In New Zealand, nationalizing 
resources has evaded the compensation requirement. In Switzerland, zoning changes are not 
permanent, but municipalities should compensate the landowner’s reasonable reliance on the 
municipalities’ reassurances that land-use will remain unaltered during a private development. A 
compensation claim arises when the government changes land-use regulations to prevent the 
landowner’s foreseeable plans after submitting a permit or variance application. The landowner 
should not assume the risk of losing her development expenditures in relying on the government’s 
current zoning plans. The compensation for zoning alteration would be the difference between the 
value of the possible use to the current restricted use. The land-use regulations should contain a 
particular description of what the government agency expects to achieve. The description will 
identify the public use in zoning changes or condemnation orders.  
If the regulation’s harm “goes too far[,]”990 the sunk development costs and reduction in 
land value corroborate the severity of a regulation’s interference with private property.991 This 
evidence restricts the judge from deciding whether conditional permits – restrictions on the 
property as a precondition to build on the property – are compensable regulatory taking because 
the harm is measurable. The state must compensate for any burdens that substantially outweigh 
private and other public benefits from continued use, and the state’s police power should not thwart 
landowners rectifying the zoning harm.992 Government actors entering the property should only 
perform non-destructive activities until the landowner’s appeal is complete, assuming there is no 
exigency that the court will review later. 




Taxation. The Studied Nations do not tax the indemnifying portion of the compensation 
awards, but Switzerland does tax the advantages from removed land-use regulations.993 
Landowners spontaneously find a value-added tax and increase property tax attached to their 
property regardless if the landowner voted or requested land-use amendments. Taxing 
nonmonetary zoning benefits should be discouraged. 
Buyback Procedures. The government should not take more than what is necessary to 
complete the public use. Courts should encourage the government to find alternative sites before 
a court concludes the government’s consideration of alternatives as adequate.994 Moreover, courts 
should not tolerate the government banning certain public works on public land to justify 
expropriating additional private land.995 Landowners may feel more indemnified when they can 
repurchase the property after it is no longer in use or was never put into use after a reasonable time. 
In such cases, New Zealand requires the landowner to pay the expropriated land’s current fair 
market value with the public work’s capital improvements. Since commercial property is more 
profitable than houses, the repurchase and reconstruction costs may exceed the property’s value 
from the time of the expropriation. A landowner wishing to restore such property to its earlier use 
would need to purchase the public work at increased market value, demolish the building, and 
rebuild their former residence or small business. To avoid this, Switzerland reflects the 
impossibility of restoring the land in the repurchase price. Some U.S. states996 and Switzerland set 
the repurchase price as the return of the compensation award, which discourages government land-
hoarding to merely increase their capital gain realization and land appreciation before the 
landowner’s buyback. The New Zealand statutes contain no buyback provision for small 
businesses and farm corporations. Only individuals can repurchase the property; therefore, a 
farmer must evaluate whether the lower taxes and personal liabilities under a farm corporation 




exceed losing the farmland without a buyback right. The buyback right needs to be non-negotiable. 
The expropriator may offer a New Zealand signing bonus to the expropriation agreement that 
requires the landowner to contract-out her right to repurchase the property.997 Even if the 
landowner raised the defense of bad-faith dealings,998 the landowner would need to repay the 
condemnation award in addition to court costs to revive the buyback right. 
Whether the expropriator continues to use the land for the particularized public use 
preconditions the buyback opportunity. The question can encourage governmental delay when the 
government can reassign the public use to a different use if they holdout selling the unused land. 
A pretext (ulterior public use) may have existed when the expropriated land is immediately 
converted to a different “public use” after the eminent domain procedure.999 The prompt diversion 
of the expropriated land’s use from one public use to an unrelated public use should trigger an 
investigation or appeal right to audit the new public use as justification for acquiring the property 
under the formerly stated public use.  
Procedural Protections. All the Studied Nations have an appeal procedure with 
limitations. The question is purpose and efficiency. The U.S. is the only jurisdiction where every 
component of the expropriation is a justiciable question, and a common-law rule could assist the 
landowner or overturn legislation as unconstitutional. Likewise, a landowner can select the venue: 
state or federal court.1000 If the state has an affinity for zoning and no eminent domain reform, the 
landowner can eliminate the home-state bias and sue in federal court. A civil code system 
(Switzerland), ouster clauses (Singapore), and parliamentary supremacy (New Zealand) minimize 
the litigation questions or scope of recovery. Litigation is efficient when multiple levels of review 
of various issues are collectively raised in one appellate, linear structure. Comparatively, appealing 
in one tribunal for public uses and a different tribunal for compensation issues increases litigation 




costs, and it contravenes the common law presumption in favor of one-stop adjudication in private 
disputes to not prolong litigation.1001 Appealing through one linear system is cost-efficient only if 
the lower courts recognize the importance of property rights; otherwise, the linear system loses its 
cost-efficiency since judicial predilections require appellate review to achieve justice. Switzerland 
and Singapore restrict what cases are heard while courts in New Zealand and the U.S. appear more 
open to all possible eminent domain disputes, except vexatious cases. 
Why countries perform better than the United States in the property right rankings? 
Business executives participating in the WEF Survey may overrate property rights in their country 
due to nationalism, lacking experience with expropriation procedures, being uninformed about 
how well property rights are protected in their country compared to the world, or being only 
informed about how bad property rights are elsewhere. 
The U.S. may have lower perceived property rights1002 due to (1) the national 
newsworthiness of eminent domain actions,1003 (2) the fact that the U.S. exercises eminent domain 
more often given its size and number of local governments, or (3) because more people participated 
in the WEF Survey with negative perceptions compared to the fewer individuals participating in 
the other Studied Nations – especially New Zealand having 77% fewer participants than the U.S. 
in 2019.1004 American landowners’ negative perception of eminent domain inflates as they 
associate greater sentimental value and endowment biases toward property.1005 Where the business 
executive participating in the WEF Survey conduct business may tremendously impact their 
assessment of U.S. eminent domain law. Most takings occur in a few states.1006 If the executive 
works in a state with bare-minimum eminent domain protections and frequent expropriations, they 
may be unaware of how other states compare against the top-ranking nations or unaware of those 
states that infrequently expropriate land.1007 They may answer the WEF Survey biased by their 




state’s laws since these states exercise eminent domain more often than others. International 
participants may conclude that their nation’s legal systems afford stronger protections of property 
rights because the government decides not to exercise its power; they don’t have a reason to worry. 
However, as Justice Strong once said, “the non-user of a power does not disprove its existence.”1008 
If the government did exercise its eminent domain power, the protections would be substandard 
upon further examination. A more meaningful redesign of the WEF Survey would ask international 
executives who have seen more than one regime or subnation to answer the property rights 
question. The international businesspersons may express less nationalism in their responses 
because they do not need to encourage foreign investment in the sole country where they conduct 
business. 
The infrequency of expropriation or the majority of condemnees accepting expropriation 
agreements may explain the higher perceived property rights. Singapore has fewer properties to 
expropriate as it acquired over 90% of the nation’s surface rights. With most property interests 
under government leases, Singaporeans sparingly litigate the expropriation to the first level of 
review: the Appeals Board had two published cases in 2019 and zero cases in 2018.  New Zealand’s 
bonus compensation has successfully dissuaded New Zealanders from appealing the expropriation 
with more notices declaring an agreement than Tribunal appeals in 2020. New Zealand and 
Singaporean1009 culture decline to elevate the importance of property rights or replicate the 
minimum standard of the United States’ Takings Clause. The culture accepts the current 
expectations, potentially raising the country’s rankings.  
Switzerland and the United States have more expropriation cases annually. Their societies’ 
propensity to resist or detest government activity that impairs their property or economy may 
negatively affect the perception of expropriations. Surprisingly, the Swiss and American tendency 




to litigate expropriation may derive from their more masculine cultures1010 and the available 
constitutional property rights to plead. The omission of a judicial review process in a civil code 
system does not forestall the Swiss from litigating expropriations to the highest authority more 
than Singapore and New Zealand. Switzerland’s and the United States’ shared constitutional 
principles may have a greater influence on the number of appeals or those appeals reaching the 
Supreme Courts. 
Interpretation & the Tyranny-of-the-Majority Problem. How constitutional rights are 
perceived determines whether the property rights are seen as a legislative gift or as naturally 
preexisting or supreme against all legislation. A natural right that supersedes the constitution 
ensures the legislature cannot revoke property rights at any moment, assuming the negative 
political consequences from the abolishment were null. The U.S. identifies property as an inherent 
right,1011 while Switzerland assigns property rights a subjective legal claim and a binding authority 
on the state.1012 Both achieve the same result. The Constitutions enumerate what legal positions 
rightsholders have against violations by state actors and the state’s duty to protect the right.1013  
The pivotal advantage of the U.S. and Swiss federal constitutions is their onerous, lengthy 
amendment procedure compared to New Zealand or Singapore. Alongside the constitution, U.S. 
jurisprudence places property rights above the government to dissuade the possibility of abolishing 
property. 
In relation to democracy, James Madison found humans’ default state is to act selfishly 
with the potential to develop a safe civil society:1014 “If men were angels, no government would 
be necessary.”1015 As a political scientist,1016 he found the history of democracies to be an unstable 
government structure, “incompatible with personal security or the rights of property[,]” and 
ephemeral due to violent revolutions between the factional political opinions with adverse rights, 




passions, interests to each other.1017 Moreover, the government’s structure – “separation of powers, 
bicameralism, and federalism” – inhibited political corruption and the tyranny-of-the-majority, not 
merely voting rights.1018 The Framers had no intention of qualifying voter eligibility to a person’s 
net worth, education, or family name;1019 instead, they aspired to subdue the recreation of the 
corrupt British aristocracy voting system – where a small elite group owned all the land and were 
eligible to vote.1020 The property ownership voting prerequisite was adopted, at least, to “avoid the 
ability for the rich to buy the votes of the poor.”1021 French diplomat Alexis de Tocqueville 
concurred that no system could remedy the precarious outcomes of democracy, such as legislative 
instability and popular laws that serve the administration’s interest and forsake freedom.1022 He 
opined that parliamentary supremacy threatened democracy given the overwhelming 
concentration of power after the majoritarian takeover,1023 and he criticized American democracy 
as provoking conformity of thought: “with everyone's opinion equal to everyone else's in a 
democracy, intellectual uncertainties and anxieties about what to believe or what to think 
produce[d] a herd instinct ... only what is authorized by majority public opinion can be 
truthful.”1024 James Madison notified the world of a threat to the new United States:  
[T]he rights of property or the claims of justice may be overruled by a majority 
without property, or interested in measures of injustice.1025 So strong is this 
propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial 
occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been 
sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. 
But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and 
unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without 
property have ever formed distinct interests in society.1026  
 
Legal historians boldly summarized Madison’s verdict:  
 
[P]roperty would always be at risk in a republic because it would always be 
vulnerable to the dissatisfaction of the (inevitable) propertyless majority; and the 
vulnerability of property rights revealed the nature of the republican threat to 
individual rights, oppression by the majority.1027 
 




Tocqueville further found that although citizens can keep their property, landowners “will be 
disregarded, ignored, overlooked, treated as ‘an impure being,’ deprived of esteem.”1028 The 
government is the instrument of the political majority that can violate property law without 
political recourse.1029 As Justice O’Connor partially referenced in her dissent of Kelo, the Framers 
drafted the Takings Clause to protect against (1) the tyranny-of-the-majority, (2) the inability of 
the propertyless to acquire and keep their property, and (3) the politically powerful from 
expropriating from the poorer, uneducated, or disreputable landowners with no political 
leverage.1030 Private-to-private takings based on special political interests could equate to the 
propertyless majority lobbying for property redistribution from the minority landowners in their 
favor.1031 Thus, the Kelo court failed to strike down the politically powerful from using 
governmental bodies as an instrument to transfer property from one landowner to a more 
influential entity. The U.S. and Singapore have deduced that the separation of powers establishes 
a limited government with judicial review serving as a counter-majoritarian check on government 
actions.1032 
Other countries were fearful of the tyranny-of-the-majority problem starting at the primary 
source: voting. Switzerland’s sentiments and reluctance to universal suffrage derogated from fears 
of mob rule.1033 Aristocratic elites in the Swiss capital were not the source of this fear because the 
cantonal constitutions controlled the election system: i.e., the small cantons found this to be a 
foreseeable problem.1034 Singapore’s founding father was unconvinced about universal suffrage as 
well, attributing a voting age of 40-and-older and having a family with children as worthier 
qualifications for voting.1035  
One question is whether the tyranny exists despite its intuitiveness?1036 Axiomatically, the 
majority could disregard the interests of the minority and systematically act towards advancing the 




majority’s economic interests at the minority’s detriment.1037 For instance, tenants have been 
known to vote in favor of fiscal spending and property tax increases compared to homeowners.1038 
Tenants consume less housing costs than homeowners of the same income level generally, and the 
net benefits from the public expenditures normally exceed the amount of property taxes shifted to 
the tenant’s rent.1039 A one-person, one-vote system could condone the voting majority to 
redistribute property to themselves.1040 Lastly, voters’ political ideology and educational 
attainment have a statistically significant influence on prolonging or dissuading eminent domain 
reform through electorate proposals.1041  No journal appears to have investigated the veracity of 
whether non-landowners in first-world countries tyrannize landowners to the extent of Madison’s 
or Tocqueville’s concerns. Nonetheless, non-landowners’ participation in expropriation decisions 
may skew the representation towards expropriation, primarily when non-landowners receive any 
net benefit. 
Without challenging the importance of universal suffrage, the historical debate on voting 
may still have merit. As a minority population, especially in cities, landowners may not be able to 
express their desires for public spending with an increased millage rate or to dissent public 
financing of more expropriations.1042 The majority can outnumber, outvote, and outspeak the 
minority voice or vote. Private entities hoping to acquire their neighbor’s property and the 
propertyless majority, who attain a net benefit from the new spending or expropriation plan, may 
silence the voice of minority-landowners through votes.1043 The argument to remove land 
ownership from the voting requirements derived from the growing trend during the Industrial 
Revolution. Most people who had wealth did not own property living in the city.1044 As property 
ownership became inessential to more lifestyles, the minority-landowning population vastly 
outvoted the growing urban population because land-ownership remained a voting prerequisite.1045 




A supermajority, as a prerequisite to enacting a proposal, may allow the landowner-minority’s 
voice to have a chance to approve or dissent the majority’s control under universal suffrage. The 
landowners who may be subjected to the project or would be taxed to build the project should have 
their minority voice be given a fighting chance against the popular vote. The legislature’s inertia 
towards reforming eminent domain in the U.S. federal government, New Zealand, Singapore, and 
other countries have proven Tocqueville’s paradox: landowners keep their land when it is 
politically convenient, but their property interests are continuously disregarded or diminished.  
Federations have better eminent domain reform than unitary nations. Switzerland and 
some U.S. states holistically performed better in this property rights analysis than Singapore and 
New Zealand. One rationale may be the importance of states and cantons. The cantonal 
constitutions devised the precedent of Swiss property rights,1046 and U.S. state eminent domain 
laws assisted in framing the federal eminent domain regime.1047  When the federal government 
fails to act, the states take action. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sutherland correctly stated, 
“[d]enial of the [states’] right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the 
nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if 
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the country [or try experiments that the whole country may not agree to 
ratify].”1048 When the states engage a corrupt public work or enacts unjust laws, the corruption will 
not spread to the whole country since the new legal theory is controlled to a city or state.1049 
In federations, lower-level governments compete under a Tiebout Hypothesis1050 where 
every citizen has preferences and knowledge of different subnational governments, and citizens 
can move to communities that satisfy their preferences.1051 The localities use laws, tax revenues, 
and public expenditures to entice new residents.1052 For investment purposes, a landowner cannot 




import another state’s eminent domain law.1053 Interstate and intercommunity competition 
influence “local legislatures to design or adopt new property regimes that are consistent with the 
preferences of local residents” or laws that would attract new residents and businesses.1054 
Lobbying fifty states or hundreds-of-thousands of small communities across America would be an 
administrative nightmare compared to convincing all the politicians in one convenient location, 
such as the capital of a unitary nation, to amend the law.1055 Less populated jurisdictions would 
incur greater costs when residents emigrate to other jurisdictions that align with their preferences 
because the less-populated states adopted repressive eminent domain regimes.1056 Although a local 
government is located in a state with unfavorable property rights, it can enforce ordinances or 
directives holding their jurisdiction to a higher standard: e.g., rejecting condemnations for 
economic redevelopment and paying a compensation premium.1057 In fact, Tocqueville praised the 
U.S. for local government action, reasoning that the states legislatures were equally jeopardized to 
the tyranny-of-the-majority as the federal government.1058 Broadly, subnational governments slow 
national trends, allowing the country to observe a state’s policy or a new property regime over 
time. In unitary countries, the laws could change overnight, with every citizen having to tolerate 
the change. New Zealand’s formation as a unitary state may have caused it to have a more 
authoritarian parliamentary supremacy system because there are no states: such as in the U.S., 
Switzerland, and Canada.1059 Countries with federalism have a better success amending their 
property rights from the bottom-up – from the state and local level – rather than advocating the 
federal government to change the nationwide approach to expropriation.  
Two reasons explain why some states enact extreme advantages for landowners as found 
in U.S. and Swiss substates: (1) culture or (2) a former history of eminent domain abuse. American 
values are less consistent than collectivist cultures concerning property rights.1060 American views 




on what kind of property protections should be favored are context-driven. A collectivist culture 
is less context-driven and more consistent in how far property should be treated as sacred.1061 
When the land can generate goods, such as cash crops, producers became more concerned about 
their ownership and protection of those commodities. Furthermore, the owner could reap her 
investment into the property with established exclusionary rights: repelling trespassers, 
conversion, or theft of those cash crops.1062 Some U.S. states have more than 50% of their land as 
part of the farm industry, meaning more residents rely on these protections for their crops.1063 
Agriculture without property rights inhibits further investments into the business and more 
resources towards defending their current, stagnant operation.1064 Strong property rights impact 
other industries by facilitating macroeconomic growth and entrepreneurial activities.1065 
Therefore, some states need property rights because of their economy and consequential culture 
considering expropriations as repugnant. Regarding state history, Oregon,1066 Missouri,1067 and 
Michigan1068 experienced eminent domain abuse or excessive legal barriers that sparked a strong 
response by the residents, including amendments to the law. Here, the residents underwent or 
witnessed the hardship before taking curative action. Only southern states, such as Alabama and 
Georgia, held a societal intolerance to the opportunity for eminent domain abuse after the Kelo 
case.1069 Therefore, public outcry from abuse or industries reliant on the land contributed to some 
U.S. states deviating from international leaders in property rights. 
Why are property rights worth preserving? Property rights serve such an indispensable 
role that it earns the name as one of “the ultimate sources of economic growth”1070 and “the 
guardian of every other right[.]”1071 Strong property rights result in lower unemployment1072 and 
greater economic growth, based on increasing growth domestic product (“GDP”) under growth 
domestic investment as a percentage of GDP,1073 or GDP per capita.1074 Securing property rights 




has consistently improved the well-being of a nation’s most improvised populations, which 
contributes to the overall reduction of poverty with higher average national income.1075 Secure 
property rights improve corporate transparency and corporate governance practices; thus, 
industries that conceal financial information and divert resources to mitigate expropriation risk, 
increases investor information asymmetry and inefficient resource allocation.1076 When 
expropriation risk rises, firms invest in harder-to-expropriate assets merely to preserve wealth 
rather than efficiently growing their businesses.1077  Stronger property rights also produce less 
political favoritism and uncertainty in ownership;1078 If the people discover that Parliament 
reneged its promise to compensate expropriations or the courts failed to rescind expropriations for 
private uses, the people will not accept or believe the government cured the expropriation risk in 
the future.1079 Property rights only thrive in a government with restrained corruption.1080 
Presuming the rule-of-law is enforced and government officials did not acquire most of the land 
through political entrenchment, property rights dramatically enhance an entire society’s growth 




There is no direct correlation between the complexity and abundance of legal property 
protections and a Studied Nation's property rights ranking via the WEF survey and other economic 
business research. Switzerland and the United States grant loftier property safeguards than New 
Zealand and Singapore, which outrank the United States. The evaluation of property rights among 
the top-ranking nations has shown greater insecurity within modern property rights regimes, with 
the United States’ decline in rankings attributable to constitutional desuetude1082 rather than 




missing legal principles. The traditional interpretations are modified with new public interests and 
legal concepts that expand government powers without adjusting for property rights to preserve 
the balance between the fundamental rights and the state’s power.   
Despite the strong property safeguards already afforded, the United Stated can improve its 
property rights by examining the practices of top-ranked jurisdictions for property rights, but based 
on the law, the United States is underrated. Switzerland provided more protections and 
sophisticated defenses than the U.S. federal government's takings clause. A few U.S. states 
outperform or directly compete with Swiss federal standards concerning landowner defenses to 
eminent domain and regulatory takings. The United States can learn from New Zealand's public 
recommendation system in Housing Projects and compensation signing-bonuses, akin to a 
premium, that entice settlements and offsets abuse. New Zealand also compensates for business 
losses, injurious affection, and replacement property loans. The United States would deliver 
comprehensive compensation to landowners if it recognized the new concept of compensating 
extreme and moderate regulatory takings, at least at the state levels, and made the Uniform 
Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act compulsory under all federal 
expropriations.1083 
 
The thesis’s other findings are summarized below: 
1. Generally, the WEF Survey properly ranks countries with better protections of property rights 
in higher quartiles than countries lacking those protections. However, the numerical value 
given to the top-ranking countries insufficiently reflects the substantive legal protections 
between the higher-performing countries.  The United States’ jurisprudence was undervalued 
numerically when it was ranked in the 30th percentile of property rights globally.1084 




Nevertheless, the general observation was correct: globally, the U.S. performs above-average 
on property rights. Therefore, this thesis recommends placing less weight on the numerical 
rankings of the WEF Survey and more independent research in future studies. The WEF Survey 
and Economic Freedom Indices cannot serve as the primary authority to compare property 
rights between countries. The same principle may apply to U.S. State comparisons of state 
property rights because some states offer more protections or compensation compared to the 
top-ranking state: Alabama. Comprehensive legal research is necessary to improve the readers’ 
decision-making on where to develop or invest in real estate. Based on the structure of the 
country and its laws, a transition in government could drastically impact property rights. 
2. A federation with strong subnational rights is more likely to initiate eminent domain reform 
and protections of property rights than unitary countries. The diverse cultures, experiences, 
and industries found in smaller, local communities influence the local preservation measures 
needed to defend property rights. The state and local governments are more likely to take 
extraordinary measures to stop potential eminent domain abuse or to prevent a state’s history 
of eminent domain abuse from repeating.  
3. A country with constitutional property rights and economic freedom has greater certainty for 
landowners seeking relief when their land undergoes expropriation or excessive regulatory 
takings. The government’s structure increases a right’s sustainability and resilience than a 
parchment right that the legislature can effortlessly amend or repeal.1085 Suggested protections 
include constitutional supremacy, a modest judicial review power, difficult-to-amend property 
rights, and a supermajority voting with the federal legislature and (1) the people or (2) the 
substate legislatures to decide crucial legal issues.  




4. Top-performing countries in property rights indemnify the landowner throughout the 
expropriation process. Indemnification means a compensation award equating to the fair 
market value of the expropriated land, plus interest for delays, and some other damages or 
costs, depending on the jurisdiction. Compensating consequential damages, a signing bonus 
for the expropriation agreement, and a compensation premium above the property’s fair market 
value are internationally recognized mechanisms to indemnify the landowner undergoing an 
expropriation. Reimbursing the landowner for transaction or relocation costs and business 
losses are also internationally accepted.  
5. The periodicity and frequency of the government’s expropriation power could influence the 
perception of a nation’s property rights. People could believe a country will not or cannot 
readily take their property merely because the government has not expropriated much land 
recently or the current administration compensates landowners at fair market value. The WEF 
Survey is unreliable when the people don’t know about the country’s expropriation history: 
e.g., expropriating many parcels at below-market prices. The nation’s culture or the 
international business experience of the WEF Survey participants may skew the results as well. 
6. Given the Studied Nations in this thesis, Switzerland may serve as the model eminent domain 
jurisdiction for civil code countries with parliamentary supremacy, and the United States may 
serve as the model jurisdiction for common law countries with constitutional supremacy. The 
U.S. eminent domain laws are competitive with the top-ranking countries in property rights.1086 
Although lacking in unamendable substantive protections, New Zealand and Singapore 
demonstrate that general property rights are not a prerequisite to legislating a stable, equitable 
eminent domain process that would mitigate the displacement of landowners as much as 




possible. For business executives in the WEF Survey, a transparent regime that compensates 
expropriations gives the perception of strong property rights despite the legal uncertainties. 
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